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I. INTRODUCTION
When a contract is breached, the traditional remedy available to the
aggrieved party is an award of money damages. Courts attempt to
place the aggrieved party in the financial position that party would have
occupied had the contract been performed-by awarding expectancy
damages.1 Such damages are those the parties reasonably should have
foreseen on the basis of facts known to them at the time of the con-
tract. 2  The aggrieved party must take reasonable action to minimize
the amount awarded3 and is prohibited from taking action that in-
creases that amount.4 As part of their agreement, the parties may stip-
ulate the amount payable on breach. If their estimate is reasonable
and the actual damages are difficult to ascertain, courts will enforce
such provisions.5
While the traditional rules have been modified by statute---particu-
and Gus Kerndt during the 1975-76 academic year and of Lisbeth Keller and Bruce
Stoltze during the summer of 1976. All were or are students at the University of Iowa
College of Law. All persons doing work in contract damages owe a debt of gratitude
to Professor E. Allan Farnsworth for his outstanding article, Legal Remedies for Breach
of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970). While the article was not cited for spe-
cific points, it had an impact on the author's thinking and that impact is hereby ac-
knowledged.
1. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 329 (1932); notes 17-19 infra and accom-
panying text.
2. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 330 (1932); notes 92-105 infra and accom-
panying text.
3. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932); notes 131-45 infra and accom-
panying text.
4. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1932); notes 116-30 infra and ac-
companying text.
5. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1932); notes 162-80 infra and accom-
panying text.
6. For statutes regulating the employee-employer relationship, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 23:10.030 (1962) (employee induced to accept employment by false representations
may recover reasonable attorneys' fees and "actual" damages); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 1103(d) (1974) (10% penalty if wages are withheld by the employer "without any
reasonable ground for dispute"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 625-A, 626 (Cum.
Supp. 1975) (establishing severance pay requirements and permitting the award of at-
torneys' fees in suits for severance pay); MINN. STAT. § 181.68 (1974) (permitting re-
covery of twice the amount of underpayment resulting from sex discrimination); N.Y.
LABOR LAW § 681(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975) (permitting farm laborers paid below the
minimum wage to recover the underpayment, attorneys' fees and a 25% penalty for a
wilful failure to pay); ORE. REV. STAT. § 652.150 (1973) (penalty of up to 30 days'
wages for failure to pay wages due an employee who is discharged or quits).
For statutes regulating a variety of specialized commercial contracts, see ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 10-716(D) (1956) (validating liquidated-damage provisions in bylaws of
cooperative marketing associations in contracts with members); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
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larly by the Uniform Commercial Code 7 -expectancy damages still
35232 (1973) (double damages against captains of steamboats who fail to place freight
in a dry, convenient place); HAwAH REV. STAT. §§ 422-23 (1968) (liquidated-damage
clauses in contracts of fish marketing associations); IND. ANN. STAT. § 15-7-116.1(a)
(Burns 1973) (liquidated-damage clauses in agricultural cooperative marketing con-
tracts). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-202 (1964) (award of $100, attorneys' fees, and other
proven damages for failure to execute release of forfeited lease); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
93E, 1 7 (1975) (damages for breach of statutory requirements governing the relation-
ship between retailers and wholesalers of petroleum products); NEB. REV. STAT. § 54-
1808 (1974) (double damages for failure to pay for slaughtered cattle by the end of
the business day following purchase), R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 4-7-22 (Cum. Supp.
1975) (treble damages and attorneys' fees for failure to pay a licensed cattle dealer for
cattle purchased); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.161 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (double recovery
against persons engaged in selling motor vehicles who fail to meet statutory obligations
to buyers).
For consumer protection laws, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-922 (Cum. Supp. 1975)
(permitting consumer to recover 10% of the transaction total or $100, whichever is
greater, plus normal expectancy damages); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-113 (1973)
(authorizing award of attorneys' fees for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protec-
tion Act): IDAHO CODE §§ 28-35-201 to 205 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (debtor's remedies un-
der the Idaho Uniform Consumer Credit Code); MICH. Coip. LAWS ANN. § 125.996
(Cum. Supp. 1975) (treble damages for wilful failure of a manufacturer or dealer to
correct a defect covered by a warranty in the sale of a mobile home); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 407.410 (Vernon Supp. 1976) (double damages for contract involving a "pyramid
sales scheme"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 502 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (treble damages when
charges for loans exceed statutory limits); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-13.03(7)
(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976) (recovery of attorneys' fees in suits by consumers when mer-
chants are found to have violated statute); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.411 to 413 (1974)
(damage awards against consumers in certain transactions).
For statutes regulating landlord-tenant relationships, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-
31.1-12.1 (1973) (treble damages against landlord who collects rent when occupancy
rate exceeds statutory limit); IowA CODE § 562.14 (1975) (punitive damages up to $200
against landlord who, acting in bad faith, retains tenant's deposit); MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 8-204(e) (1974) (landlord liable for consequential damages for failure
to provide tenant with possession at the time called for in the lease); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:8-21.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (double recovery and attorneys' fees for wrongful fail-
ure of landlord to return tenant's deposit); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2842 (Cum. Supp.
1975) (damage remedies against landlord who fails to provide essential services).
For general rules of contract damages, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1402 et seq.
(1975) (dealing with the nature of contract damages, liquidated damages, penalties, ex-
penses of litigation, exemplary damages, remote and consequential damages, foreseeabil-
ity requirements, interest, nominal damages, mitigation, discretion of juries, necessary
expenses, and special provisions relating to breach of covenants relating to land).
For statutes regulating contracts with public agencies, see Miss. CODE ANN. § 29-1-
47 (1972) (portion of purchase price paid by buyer of forfeited tax lands as liquidated
damages); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 54.04.080 (Supp. 1975) (deposit as proper measure
of liquidated damages in bids submitted to public utility districts).
For special contract damage provisions, see CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1670-71 (Deering
1970) (liquidated damages); CONN. GEN. SrAT. REV. § 52-236 (1975) (aggrieved party
in contract action may introduce evidence of damages accrued after filing of suit).
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, art. 2, pt. 7.
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constitute the usual response to damage suits "on the contract."" In
appropriate cases, the injured party has the option of waiving a contract
recovery and suing for restitution of the value of the partial perform-
ance rendered, an amount not limited by the contract price.9 Ag-
grieved parties also may obtain money recoveries on a promissory
estoppel theory, 10 through the partial-enforcement concept of the tenta-
tive Restatement (Second) of Contracts" or the full-enforcement rule
of the original Restatement.'2 The party who breaches the contract
also has restitutionary rights.' 3 The breaching party generally is able
to recover the value of the performance rendered before breach, sub-
ject to the aggrieved party's right to expectancy damages, up to a
maximum share of the contract price proportionate to the work com-
pleted.' 4 Finally, reliance damages are available when an expectancy
recovery is too remote and speculative to be ascertained.'5
This Article is devoted primarily to describing and analyzing the con-
ceptual framework within which courts traditionally have awarded ex-
pectancy damages-the "primer" and "critique" of the title. Expec-
tancy rules lie at the center of traditional theory and are widely ac-
cepted. In many instances, however, they create problems in applica-
tion and thus frequently are ignored by the courts. The existence of
several different and contradictory bases for recovery in any given suit
creates further problems. Despite the apparent widespread acceptance
of the expectancy rules, therefore, Professor Gilmore has suggested that
expectancy damages are dead or at least dying.' 6 Before we can deter-
mine the state of its health, however, the system itself must be under-
stood. This Article, which analyzes the traditional system of expec-
tancy damages, is a preface to further work examining the present state
and future prospects of expectancy damages.
8. As distinguished from suits seeking the restitution of value given, when a claim
is "on the contract," the calculation of damages normally starts with the contract price.
9. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 346 (1932); notes 208-19 inIra and accom-
panying text.
10. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 90 (1932).
11. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 90 (Tent. Draft 1973).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRAcrs § 357 (1932); notes 220-26 infra and accom-
panying text.
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTs § 333 (1932); notes 198-207 infra and ac-
companying text.
16. G. GILMORE, TIm DEATH OF CONTRACT 51-53, 83-84, 88 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as GILMopm].
[Vol. 1976:179
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II. EXPECTANCY DAMAGES-
THE TRADITION AND THE THEORY
A. The General Rule
1. Total Breach
Whatever complicating factors may arise in calculating expectancy
damages, the goal remains constant: to ascertain the dollar amount
necessary to ensure that the aggrieved party's position after the award
will be the same-to the extent money can achieve the identity-
as if the other party had performed.1 7  The courts assume that the
reasonable expectations of the parties define the position they would
have achieved had the contract been performed; these expectations are
treated as substitutes for actual performance. Subject to limitations on
17, See Alover Distrib., Inc. v. Kroger Co., 513 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1975)
(long-term contract for sale of ice cream); Pelz v. Christian Herald Ass'n, 486 F.2d 94,
97 (5th Cir. 1973) (travel agency's breach of exclusive agency relationship with tour
operator); Interstate United Corp. v. White, 388 F.2d 5, 7 (10th Cir. 1968) (contract
for sale of a vending machine business); Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp.
1212, 1234 (D. Colo. 1972) (contract for sale of corporation); Mid-Continent Tel.
Corp. v. Home Tel. Co., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1198 (N.D. Miss. 1970) (corporate merger
agreement); Hover v. Kirk, 56 Ala. App. 257, 259, 321 So. 2d 214, 216 (1975) (sale
of home); McBain v. Pratt, 514 P.2d 823, 828 (Alas. 1973) (husband agreed to leave
his law practice or its value to his children); Rebsamen Cos. v. State Hosp. Employees
Fed. Credit Union, 258 Ark. 160, 162-63, 522 S.W.2d 845, 847 (1975) (default on se-
cured note); Fisher v. Hampton, 44 Cal. App. 3d 741, 752, 118 Cal. Rptr. 811, 817
(1975) (drilling an oil-gas well); Taylor v. State Bank, 165 Colo. 576, 580, 440 P.2d
772, 774 (1968) (special bank-account agreement); Bell v. McCann, 36 Colo. App. -,
-, 535 P.2d 233. 235 (1975) (construction of house); Gordon v. Indusco Mgmnt.
Corp., 164 Conn. 262, 272. 320 A.2d 811, 818 (1973) (construction contract); Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Pickard, 269 So. 2d 714, 723 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972) (sale of fiberglass
hulls); Crawford & Assoc., Inc. v. Groves-Keen, Inc., 127 Ga. App. 646, 650, 194 S.E.2d
499, 502 (1972) (sale of customer lists); Goodwin, Inc. v. Coe Pontiac, Inc., 62 Mich.
App. 405, 409, 233 N.W.2d 598, 602 (1975) (sale of automobile dealership); McDaniel
Bros. Constr. Co. v. Jordy, 195 So. 2d 922, 925 (Miss. 1967) (brokering construction
contract); Boten v. Brecklein, 452 S.W.2d 86, 93 (Mo. 1970) (management contract);
Peter Salvucci & Sons, Inc. v. State, 110 N.H1 136, 154, 268 A.2d 899, 911 (1970), af 'd,
111 N.H. 259, 281 A.2d 164 (1971) (highway construction); Allen v. Allen Title Co.,
77 N.M. 796, 798, 427 P.2d 673, 675 (1967) (escrow agreements); Fulcher v. Nelson,
273 N.C. 221, 226, 159 S.E.2d 519, 523 (1968) (sale of car); Kotan v. School
Dist. No. I 1C, 13 Ore. App. 139, 151, 509 P.2d 452, 458 (1973) (employment con-
tract); United Bank v. Dick Herriman Ford, Inc., 215 Va. 373, 376, 210 S.E.2d 158,
161 (1974) (failure to record lien on title certificate); Prier v. Refrigeration Eng'r Co.,
74 Wash. 2d 25, 30, 442 P.2d 621, 624 (1968) (installation of ice rink surface); Den-
hart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 21 Wis. 2d 583, 595-96, 124 N.W.2d 664, 670-71 (1963)
(employment contract).
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awarding consequential (or special)"5 damages, therefore, the ex-
pectancy award is calculable by subtracting the injured party's actual
dollar position as a result of the breach from that party's projected dollar
position had performance occurred.1"
Problem 1. The Buyer Recovers. Alice, a subdivider, and Bob, a
school teacher, entered into a written contract under which Alice was
to sell and Bob to buy a specific lot of land for $2,700. The market price
for the lot was $3,000. When Bob tendered $2,700 to Alice and
requested that the lot be conveyed, Alice refused, saying that she had
sold it to Clara. Bob filed suit against Alice requesting money dam-
ages.2 0
If Alice's action were a breach of contract, Bob would recover $300.21
The object of expectancy damages is to place Bob in the position
he would have occupied had the contract not been breached. Had the
contract been performed, Bob would have paid Alice $2,700 and he
would have received land worth $3,000-a net gain to Bob of $300.
Since he retained the $2,700, a $300 award would leave him with the
net gain he would have had but for the breach. The $300 award would
also leave Alice in the dollar position she would have occupied had she
performed-losing $300 as the result of exchanging a $3,000 lot for
$2,700 in cash. In Problem 1, therefore, expectancy damages would
leave both parties in the position in dollar terms they would have
achieved with performance.
18. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1854); notes 93-115 in-
fra and accompanying text.
19. See note 17 supra.
20. See Boyd v. Mercantile Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 28 Md. App. 18, 22, 344 A.2d
148, 152 (1975) (money damages for breach of real estate contract). Alice no longer
owns the land, having conveyed it to Clara. Unless Clara takes the land with notice
of Bob's interest, specific performance will not be available to him as a remedy. See
Grummel v. Hollenstein, 90 Ariz. 356, 359, 367 P.2d 960, 962 (1962). If Alice merely
contracts to convey to Clara, Bob might succeed in an action for specific performance.
See Bolton v. Barber, 233 Ga. 646, 648-49, 212 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1975). In any event,
Bob is free to file a damage action.
21. See Mitchell v. Fritz Silberman Realty Corp., 27 Il1. App. 3d 262, 264, 327 N.E.
2d 183, 184 (1975); Dunning v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 483 S.W.2d 423, 428 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972) (American rule on damages: "When a contract relating to the purchase of
real estate has been breached, the rule in this and most states is that the vendee is en-
titled to damages in a sum equal to the difference between the unpaid part of the agreed
purchase price and the market price of the land"); Kellog v. DePasquale, 42 App. Div.
2d 667, 345 N.Y.S.2d 702, 703 (1973). But see Charles County Broadcasting Co.
v. Meares, 270 Md. 321, 326, 311 A.2d 27, 31 (1973) (English rule: damages limited
to return of earnest money unless vendor acted in bad faith, in which case full value
of land is awarded); Flureau v. Thornhill, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1776). See also
Ocean Air Tradeways, Inc. v. Arkay Realty Corp., 480 F.2d 1112 (9th Cir. 1973) (Cal-
ifornia follows English rule in bankruptcy cases).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/1
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A general formula is applicable to cases in which a seller, having
madc an unfavorable contract, fails to perform. An award calculated
by subtracting the contract price from the market price at the time and
place of breach 22 will give expectancy to the buyer. Expenses saved
by the buyer as a result of the breach must be subtracted, 23 and inciden-
tal damages added," however, to leave the buyer in the same position
as if the contract were performed. If incidental damages are added,
Alice is left in a worse position than if she performs unless the expenses
saved by nonperformance are at least as large as the incidental damages
awarded to Bob.
If the transaction in Problem 1 involved the sale of a used car
rather than land, the Uniform Commercial Code rather than the analy-
sis presented above would govern in every jurisdiction but Louisiana.2 5
The analysis and result, however, are identical. Code section 2-713(1)
imposes a market price-contract price formula to achieve the ex-
pectancy goal codified in section 1-106(1) of the Code.2 6
The expectancy damage system concentrates on achieving expect-
ancy for the aggrieved party. As in Problem 1, however, where there
are no consequential or incidental damages, the system leaves the
breaching seller with her expectancy loss. If the expectancy system
forms the basis of an out-of-court settlement, Alice neither gains nor
loses. Whether or not she performs the unfavorable contract, she
occupies the same position. If a compromise settlement is reached, she
might achieve a better position than had she performed.27 To this
22. See Tansil v. Horlock, 204 So. 2d 457, 461-62 (Miss. 1967); Wilt v. Waterfield,
273 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Mo. 1954); Missouri Slope Livestock Auction, Inc. v. Wachter,
107 N.W 2d 349, 352-53 (N.D. 1961) (applying statute); Freedman v. Cholick, 233
Ore. 569. 572. 379 P.2d 575, 577 (1963); Roselawn Cemetery, Inc. v. Martin, 415 S.W.
2d 442, 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967 no writ) (cemetery plots).
23. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 335 (1932).
24. E.g., Tansil v. Horlock, 204 So. 2d 457, 462 (Miss. 1967) (seller liable for cost
incurred by buyer in moving and storing furniture). See also Missouri Slope Livestock
Auction. Inc. v. Wachter, 107 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (N.D. 1961) (applying statute).
25. See R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMER-
CIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 19 (2d ed. 1974).
26, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-713(1).
27. If the case is tried, charges by lawyers and court costs decrease the net recovery
of the aggrieved party and increase the cost of the breach to the party who breaches.
Both sides are under some economic pressures to compromise. Any settlement for an
amount below the market-price-contract-price differential will leave the breaching seller
in a better position than if he performed; and a settlement in which the aggrieved party
receives the market-price-contract-price differential, minus any amount less than the cost
Vol. 1976: 179]
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extent the system encourages her to breach. In economic terms Alice is
indifferent between performance and breach.28  While nonlegal pres-
sures may encourage Alice to perform,20 neither the law nor considera-
tions of immediate profit or loss push Alice in either direction.
Settlement of disputes takes the time of those involved and may re-
quire lawyer participation (and fees), with or without litigation. Even
without lawyer participation, the time the parties spend in negotiations
must be included as an economic cost of the breach. The only way
the cost of settlement will approach zero-and the only way expectancy
will be achieved-is if Bob accepts Alice's tender of $300 and neither
party disputes liability or the amount of damages. Thus, in most cases,
achievement of expectancy is more fictional than real.
Problem 2. The Seller Recovers. Same basic fact pattern as Problem
1 except that the contract price was $3,000, the market price was
$2,700, and the buyer, Bob, refused to perform.
In a suit for money damages, Alice would recover $300.80
Except that the parties are reversed-the buyer rather than the
seller breaching-Problem 2 may be analyzed in almost the same lan-
of litigating, will leave the aggrieved party in a better position than if he litigated the
case, plus saving the time lost in court.
28. Alice's indifference between paying damages and performing the contract is
analogous to the "indifference curves" of economic theory, if she enters a great many
contracts and the cost of performance or breach is measured solely in dollars. See P.
SAm-JESON, ECoNOMICS 435-40, 443-48 (10th ed. 1976).
29. See L. FRMDMAN, CoNTRAcT LAw IN AMERICA 200 (1965); Friedman & Macau-
ley, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and Future, 1967 Wis. L. Rpv.
805.
A court fight is likely to be inconsistent with continuing business relationships;
it makes better economic sense to compromise than to battle through courts
if the goodwill or potential profitability of a relationship are worth more than
a possible Pyrrhic victory in a lawsuit.
L. FRIEDMAN, supra at 200.
30. See Kudokas v. Balkus, 26 Cal. App. 3d 744, 753, 103 Cal. Rptr. 318, 323
(1972) (applying the benefit-of-bargain rule in favor of aggrieved vendor of a motel);
F. Poss Farms, Inc. v. Miller, 35 Colo. App. 152, 154, 529 P.2d 1343, 1344 (1974)
(benefit-of-bargain rule for aggrieved vendor of land); Duffin v. Patrick, 216 Kan. 81,
82-83, 530 P.2d 1230, 1231-32 (1975) (benefit-of-bargain rule is "settled law in this
state"); Kasten Constr. Co. v. Jolles, 262 Md. 527, 531, 278 A.2d 48, 51 (1971) (de-
clining to apply good-faith-bad-faith distinction to buyer's breach, although distinction
followed by Maryland in cases of seller's breach); Frank v. Jansen, - Minn. -, -,
226 N.W.2d 739, 746 (1975); Thomas F. Ruane Dev. Corp. v. Cullere, 134 N.J. Super.
245, 252, 339 A.2d 229, 232 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Aboud v. Adams, 84 N.M.
683, 689, 507 P.2d 430, 436 (1973); Senior Estates, Inc. v. Bauman Homes, Inc., 272
Ore. 577, 583-86, 539 P.2d 142, 145 (1975); Mahoney v. Tingley, 10 Wash. App. 814,
820, 520 P.2d 628, 633 (1974). rev'd on other grounds, 85 Wash. 2d 95, 529 P.2d 1068
(1975).
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guage as Problem 1. The market price would be subtracted from the
contract price rather than the reverse;"' if a specific used car were
involved, Uniform Commercial Code section 2-708(1)32 would apply
instead of section 2-713(1).
The identity of analysis illustrates the system's consistent goal of
eliminating the impact of the breach by elevating the aggrieved party
to the position that would have been achieved absent a breach. By
compelling the breaching party to pay damages calculated in this way,
the system has the effect, if not the purpose, of leaving the breaching
party in a similar expectancy position. Both problems involve a breach
by the party who made an unfavorable contract; and consequential or
incidental damages are not involved in either problem. In each, the
costs of litigation or even of settlement would defeat the expectancy
goal.
Problem 3. Identical Market and Contract Prices. Same basic
fact pattern as Problem 2-the buyer, Bob, breaching--except that the
contract price and the market price of the lot were $3,000.
With the contract price and market price in balance the transaction
is neutral in economic terms. Had Bob performed, Alice would have
conveyed a $3,000 lot to Bob in return for a payment of $3,000.
In dollar terms neither Alice nor Bob would have changed position as
the result of performance. Since Alice now occupies as good a position
without performance as with performance, her recovery would be lim-
ited to a nominal amount 3 -- a token recognizing that a contract was
made and was breached.34  The same result follows whichever party
breached.
31. See note 30 supra.
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708(1).
33. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C. Cir.
1952) (reducing $500 award to one dollar nominal damages); United States v. Thomas
B. Bourne Assoc., 367 F. Supp. 919, 921 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (donor-promisee of a third-
party-beneficiary contract recovers only nominal damages for the promisor's failure to
perform); Huntington Corp. v. Inwood Constr. Co., 472 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ($10 nominal damage award for breach of construction con-
Iract); Shields v. DeVries, 70 Wash. 2d 296, 301, 422 P.2d 828, 832 (1967) ($2,000
award reduced to between $1 and $25 nominal damages). But see Thomas F. Ruane
Dev. Corp. v. Cullere, 134 N.J. Super. 245, 252, 339 A.2d 229, 233 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975) (aggrieved seller who retains $17,000 deposit on contract that would have
yielded $5,000 profit not entitled to nominal damages).
34. The term nominal damages means a trivial sum-usually one cent or one
dollar-awarded to a plaintiff whose legal right has been technically violated
but who has proved no real damage. On the other hand, compensatory dam-
ages are awarded to repair the actual damage which the plaintiff proved he suf-
fered at the hands of the defendant. Obviously a plaintiff cannot be entitled
to both forms of damages. It is equally obvious that he cannot be awarded
the substantial sum of $500 in the guise of nominal damages. ...
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Neither party has any particular economic incentive to perform.
Market price being defined as the price at which the lot could be resold
in the normal course of events,3" Alice would feel no economic pressure
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888, 890 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
In discussing nominal damages in Sweet v. Johnson, 169 Cal. App. 2d 630, 337 P.2d
499 (1959), the court said:
A plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages for the breach of a contract,
despite inability to show that actual damage was inflicted upon him . . . ,
since the defendant's failure to perform a contractual duty is, in itself, a legal
wrong that is fully distinct from the actual damages. The maxim that the law
will not be concerned with trifles does not, ordinarily, apply to violation of
a contractual right.
Recognizing these principles of law, defendant concedes that the failure of
the trial court to award nominal damages by reason of his breach of contract
constituted error. However, he takes the position that if plaintiff is to prevail
on appeal he must show that an award of damages is necessary to conserve
some permanent right, or that an award of nominal damages would carry costs.
While the general rule is that the failure to award nominal damages is not
alone ground for reversal of a judgment or for a new trial . . . , there are ex-
ceptions to the rule . . . . [one being that] "nominal damages in the given case
would carry costs" . . . [and the other being that a nominal damage award]
would determine some question of permanent right.
Id. at 632, 337 P.2d at 500-01.
35. [While the worth or value of property is, in one sense of the word, what
price it will command on the market, it is a reasonable and equitable proposi-
tion that, where damages are sought to be recovered for failure to convey land,
its value is not conclusively established by reference to the peak prices or bot-
tom prices of an abnormal, feverish, and fluctuating speculative market, but is
rather "the fair value of the property, as between one who wants to purchase
and one who wants to sell it-not what it could be obtained for in peculiar
circumstances, when greater than its fair price could be obtained; not its spec-
ulative value, not the value obtained through the necessities of another. Nor,
on the other hand, is it to be limited to that price which the property would
bring when forced off at auction under the hammer." Southern Illinois
& M. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 194 Mo. 175 (92 S.W. 475) [1906]. ...
"Real value" is defined by the Kentucky court as the market value at a sale
"under ordinary, normal conditions, unaffected by any combination of produc-
ers or dealers whose object is to create an abnormal condition in that market."
Commonwealth v. International Harv. Co., 131 Ky. 551 (115 S.W. 703)
[1909]. In California it is held that market value is synonymous with actual
cash value. City of Los Angeles v. Western Union Oil Co., 161 Cal. 204 (118
Pac. 720) [1911].
In State v. Parsons, 109 Mo. App. 432, 440 (84 S.W. 1019) [1905], market
value is said to be actual money value, and "is established when other property
of the same kind has been the subject of purchase or sale to so great an extent
and in so many instances, that the value becomes fixed."
Abrams v. Sinn, 193 Iowa 528, 532-33, 187 N.W. 491, 492 (1922). See also American
Electronics Labs., Inc. v. Dopp, 369 F. Supp. 1245, 1251 (D. Del. 1974) ("The market
value of stock . . . [is] the price that a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree
upon . . ."); Sackett v. Spindler, 248 Cal. App. 2d 220, 56 Cal. Rptr. 435. (1967)
(market price of securities):
"[M]arket price" and "market value" mean the same thing, that is, the price or
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to perform, ' although she undoubtedly would prefer to avoid the effort
and possible cost of reselling. Bob is free to breach without liability for
money damages. As in the first two problems, the Uniform Commer-
cial Code result would be the same." Litigation or lawyer-assisted
settlement would place both parties in a position worse than if there
had been no breach.
Problem 4. A Good Buy. Same basic fact pattern as Problem 2-
$3,000 contract price; $2,700 market price; the buyer, Bob, breached.
A few days before she contracted to sell the lot to Bob, Alice purchased
it for $1,000.
That Alice paid $1,000 for the lot would not change the result."
Her expectancy damages remain $300. Alice retained possession of
the lot and by definition could sell it for the market price, $2,700. Alice
would make the same $2,000 profit if Bob did not breach: $1,700
on the new sale plus $300 recovered from Bob.
Land being unique, Alice could not have resold the lot except for
Bob's refusal to perform. That Bob's breach made her resale
possible is an important element in the analysis. Had the transaction
involved goods that were in plentiful supply, Alice's second sale might
not have been a resale but a transaction wholly independent of the con-
tract with Bob. In such a case, Alice might be able to invoke section
2-708(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code and recover the difference
between the contract price and her cost.39  If the transaction had
value of the article as established or shown by sales in the way of ordinary
business . . . . [W]hen there is no market available at the time and place
of performance . . . resort may be had to the market value of the goods at
the nearest available market . . . [or] the difference between the contract price
and the value of the goods as best as can be ascertained, or the difference be-
tween the contract price and the best offer that can be obtained for the goods,
or the difference between the contract price and the price obtained on a resale,
or the actual damages naturally and directly resulting from the buyer's
breach.
Id. at 236, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 445.
36. See notes 27-29 supra and accompanying text. Since market price is defined
as the average or usual contract price, see note 35 supra, there rarely will be pressure
to perform.
37. While the expectancy damage sections, §§ 2-708, 2-713, make no provision for
nominal damages, such damages are thought to be available to aggrieved parties. R.
NoitDsTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 423 (1970).
38, See Thomas F. Ruane Dev. Corp. v. Cullere, 134 N.J. Super. 245, 251-52, 339
A.2d 229, 232-33 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (rejecting vendor's efforts to recover the
difference between the contract price and the cost to the vendor of acquiring the prop-
erty).
39. UNWuORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708(2); see also notes 181-87 infra and ac-
Companying text.
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involved a specific secondhand car, however, the contract-price-market-
price differential would have controlled and Alice would have recov-
ered $300 without regard to her cost.40  In the sense that the resale
would not have been possible but for Bob's breach, the specific second-
hand car, like the real estate, is unique.
Problem 5. Double Profit? Same basic fact pattern as Problem 2
-$3,000 contract price; $2,700 market price; the buyer, Bob, breached
-except that two hours after Bob repudiated, Alice sold the lot to Clara
for $3,200.
That Alice resold the lot for $3,200 would not change the result.
Under traditional theory, she would be able to recover $300 from
Bob 4 1 While Alice apparently would make a double profit by receiv-
ing $300 from Bob and $500 over -the market price from Clara for the
same lot, the traditional expectancy damage rules permit Alice to
recover without regard to action taken after breach. Profits from resale
do not mitigate her damage award. At common law the market price
is established at the time of the breach regardless of who breached,4 2
although subsequent actions such as resale may have an impact-al-
though not controlling-on the determination of market price at the
time of breach.43
40. UNIFORM CoMMRCIA. CODE § 2-708(1). See Miller v. Belk, 23 N.C. App.
1, 5-6, 207 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1974) (denying U.C.C. § 2-706 contract-price-resale-price
award and "relegating" the aggrieved seller to the § 2-708(1) contract-price-market-prico
measure when aggrieved seller of a going business resold after buyer's repudiation and
had not satisfied the requirements of § 2-706).
41. See VanBuskirk v. McClenahan, 163 Cal. App. 2d 633, 638, 329 P.2d 924, 927-
28 (1958) (construing statute to embody common-law rule that aggrieved seller may re-
sell land without thereby reducing allowable damages). But see Ashurst v. Rosser, 275
Ala. 163, 168, 153 So. 2d 240, 245 (1963) (excess of resale price over contract price
deducted from special damages awarded to aggrieved vendor for costs involved In the
resale).
42. See Royer v. Carter, 37 Cal. 2d 544, 549, 233 P.2d 539, 542-43 (1951); Soren-
son v. Connelly, - Colo. App. -, -, 536 P.2d 328, 331 (1975); Duffin v. Patrick,
216 Kan. 81, 82, 530 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1975); Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d 193, 195
(Ky. 1961); Frank v. Jansen, - Minn. -, -, 226 N.W.2d 739, 745 (1975); Thomas
F. Ruane Dev. Corp. v. Cullere, 134 N.J. Super. 245, 251, 339 A.2d 222, 232 (Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1975). For cases involving the sale of goods, see Martin v. House of
Carpets, 41 Ala. App. 460, 462, 135 So. 2d 171, 173 (1961); J.M. Rodriguez & Co. v.
Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 32 N.Y.2d 425, 429, 299 N.E.2d 243, 244-47, 345 N.Y.S.
2d 993, 1000 (1973); Sal's Furniture Co. v. Peterson, 86 R.I. 203, 210, 133 A.2d 770,
774 (1957); Rector v. DeArana, 398 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. 1966). See also Anderson
v. Michel, 88 Idaho 228, 236, 398 P.2d 228, 233 (1965) (value of property at time of
contracting "immaterial").
43. See Sorenson v. Connelly, - Colo. App.-, -, 536 P.2d 328, 331 (1975) (re-
sale price of property following breach is evidence of market value); Duffin v. Patrick,
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Awarding Alice $300 when she has resold the lot for $3,200 appears
to go beyond her reasonable expectations. But for Bob's breach,
Alice would not have been able to sell the lot to Clara. Alice thus
made a $300 profit on her contract with Bob and a $500 profit on
her contract with Clara. The gain on each contract represented Alice's
ability or luck in selling subdivision lots. It is at least arguable that
Bob is not entitled to an advantage merely because he dealt with a per-
son like Alice who was capable of inducing another to buy the lot at
a high price. Alice might achieve a better position than she reasonably
could have expected when she contracted with Bob, but, at least argu-
ably, she has earned the double profit.
In any case, requiring Bob to pay $300 would not penalize him. It
would leave him in the same position he would have occupied had he
performed-$300 poorer. In Problem 5, the common-law expectancy
system would leave Alice, the injured party, in a better position than
she would have achieved had Bob performed, and would leave Bob,
the party who breached, in as good-or as bad-a position as if he had
performed.
If Problem 5 involved a sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial
Code would not vary the common-law result. While section 2-706 of
the Code (seller's remedy) and section 2-712 (buyer's remedy)
provide measures of damages that take into account the resale
or cover price, neither section appears to be mandatory.44 If Alice's
resale of a used car meets the conditions established in section
2-70611 and the price is below market, Alice may take advantage of
the situation and recover the larger amount determined by subtracting
the below-market resale price from the contract price.46 If the resale
216 Kan. 81, 83, 530 P.2d 1230, 1232 (1975); Sheehy v. Galipeau, 48 N.J. Super. 95,
102-03, 137 A.2d 5, 10 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) ("the resale price is prima facie
though not conclusive evidence of the market value").
44. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 294 (7th
Cir. 1974) (failure to cover does not bar any remedy except consequential damages, cit-
ing U.C.C. H 2-712, 2-715(2)(a)); Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339
F. Supp. 341, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972) (§ 2-708 benefit-
of-bargain award for portion of resale not governed by § 2-706); Everett Plywood Corp.
v. United States, 512 F.2d 1082, 1092 (Ct. CL. 1975) (award of benefit-of-bargain against
federal government without regard to aggrieved buyer's later purchases); Miller v. Belk,
23 N.C. App. 1, 207 S.E.2d 792 (1974) (benefit-of-bargain award to seller who resold
without complying with the requirements of § 2-706).
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-706.
46. See Holiday Mfg. Co. v. B.A.S.F. Systems, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1096, 1105 (D.
Neb. 1974); Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 352 (S.D.
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is above market, however, as in Problem 5, the seller probably is free
to ignore the resale and recover the normal market-price-contract-price
differential." An aggrieved buyer is very likely to have the same
options.48 If the cover purchase meets the requirements of section
2-712 4 and is made at a price above market, the buyer may recover
the difference between the cover price and the contract price; 0 if the
buyer covers at below market, the buyer probably is free to ignore the
cover price and use the market price as the basis of recovery."' The
Code differs from the common law, however, by fixing the market
N.Y.), affd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972); Alco Standard Corp. v. F & B Mfg. Co.,
51 Ill. 2d 186, 281 N.E.2d 652 (1972).
47. Whether the draftsmen intended a seller who has resold to recover more
in damages under 2-708(1) than he could under 2-706 is not clear. We con-
clude that he should not be permitted to recover more under 2-708(1) than
under 2-706, but we admit we are swimming upstream against a heavy current
of implication which flows from the comments and the Code history. Yet 1-
106 indicates that a seller who has resold may not invoke 2-708(1). That sec-
tion states that Code remedies are to put the aggrieved party in as good a posi-
tion as performance would have, but no better. By hypothesis our seller would
recover more under 2-708(1) than he "needs" to make himself whole. Section
1-106 derives faint assistance from the third sentence in Comment 1 to 2-703:
"Whether the pursuit of one remedy bars another depends entirely on the facts
of the individual case." The comment at least suggests that the seller's use of
one remedy may foreclose his use of another. Yet, the immediately preceding
sentence in the same comment says: "This Article rejects any doctrine of elec-
tion of remedy as a fundamental policy and thus the remedies are essentially
cumulative in nature and include all of the available remedies for breach."
J. WHIr & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAV UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 223 (1972). See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE
L.J. 199, 259-61 (1963).
48. The buyer's option to elect the cover (§ 2-712) or market price (§ 2-713) has
given rise to a debate like that concerning §§ 2-706 and 2-708. See J. WHrI & R. SUm-
MERS, supra note 47, at 190-91; Peters, supra note 47, at 259-61. It seems clear
from the language of the Code and the decided cases that the buyer is under no
obligation to cover. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508
F.2d 283, 294 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Failure to cover does not bar any remedy except
consequential damages"); Flood v. M.P. Clark, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 970, 971 (E.D. Pa.
1971) ("The law is clear that. . . a party is under no obligation to effect cover...").
In the Flood case, however, the court held that while there was no obligation to cover,
if cover is effected, the aggrieved party "may recover as damages only the difference
between the cost of his cover and the contract price." The Flood case supports the posi-
tion taken by Professors White and Summers and seems inconsistent with the language
and legislative history of the U.C.C.
49. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-712.
50. R.L. Pohlman Co. v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 399 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D.
Mo. 1975).
51. See note 48 supra.
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price at the time the buyer learned of the breach rather than at the
time of the breach.52
The Official Comments to the Code do not explain why the
aggrieved buyer or seller may retain any gain resulting from cover or
resale while being able to charge to the party who breached any loss
resulting from cover or resale.53 Perhaps the drafters of the Code did
not want to give the breaching party an advantage resulting from the
skill or luck of the aggrieved party in buying below market or selling
above market. As at common law, the breaching party is unlikely to re-
ceive much sympathy when complaining about a result that leaves her
or him in as good-or as bad-a position as if the contract were per-
formed.
Problem 6. A Foolish Move. Same basic fact pattern as Problem 2-
$3,000 contract price; $2,700 market price-except that the seller,
Alice, refused to convey the lot.
Bob would recover nominal damages. 54 If Bob simply accepted the
fact of the breach and took no action, Alice's breach would save Bob
$300. By taking no action after the breach, Bob would return to status
quo ante, thereby avoiding the $300 loss from the unfavorable contract.
Alice also would return to her pre-contract position, losing the $300 she
would have gained from performance. If litigation ensued, however, at
least part of the $300 Bob saved as the result of the breach would be
dissipated in legal fees; Alice's $300 loss would be increased by the
amount of her litigation expenses.
Expectancy, which dominates the solutions to the first five problems,
ceases to be the goal when the person who makes a favorable contract
breaches it. If expectancy were the goal, Bob should be required to
pay Alice $300 despite her breach. Nominal damages permit Bob to
escape without paying for the mistake he made in entering a losing
contract. " A sanction is imposed on Alice by denying her the benefit
of the bargain. No comparable sanction is imposed on those who fail
to perform contracts unfavorable to them. They are left in as bad a
position as if they performed, but they are not necessarily left in a
worse position. The system appears to apply pressure to perform on
the party who makes a favorable contract.
52. See note 26 supra.
53. See notes 7-8 supra.
54. See notes 33-34 supra.
55. By entering the contract Bob signified his opinion that the property was worth
at least as much as the contract price.
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Common sense suggests that a person who makes an unfavorable
contract is more likely to be disgruntled and, thus, to breach than a
person who makes a favorable contract. If the system applies pressure
to perform in only one of these situations, it should be on the party
most likely to breach. The expectancy damage system does just the
opposite.
The nominal damage award in Problem 6 clearly is inconsistent with
an expectancy approach, and makes little economic sense.50 A reason-
able alternative is difficult to suggest. The expectations of the parties
would require an award to the party who breached, or an award without
regard to fault. Although the courts are understandably reluctant to
reward a breaching party, a $300 award to Alice would reward her not
for breaching the contract, but for her sagacity or luck in entering a
favorable contract.
Whatever judgment one makes concerning the justification for
imposing a sanction-loss of expected profits-on the party who
breaches a favorable contract, it is clear that the award of nominal dam-
ages leaves both parties in a position inconsistent with the expectancy
goal.
Problem 7. The Owner Breaches. Alice, a contractor, and Bob, the
owner of a lot, entered a contract under which Alice was to build a
house on Bob's lot for $40,000, payable on completion. When Alice
had spent $11,000 on the job, Bob ordered her to remove her crews
and to cease work. Alice did as directed. She filed suit for breach of
contract and at trial was able to prove that she could have completed
the house at a total cost to her of $33,000-the $11,000 already spent
plus $22,000.
If Bob's action amounted to a repudiation, Alice could recover
$18,000.57 Had Alice completed the job, her profit would have been
$7,000-the $40,000 contract price less expenses of $33,000. Since
Alice had spent $11,000 at the time she was ordered from the job, an
$18,000 award would leave her with her $7,000 expectancy. When the
56. A nominal damage award for breach of contract is significant only as it carries
with it an award of costs or determines some question having a future impact. Sweet
V. Johnson, 169 Cal. App. 2d 630, 632-33, 337 P.2d 499, 500-01 (1959).
57. See Robertson v. Ceola, 255 Ark. 703, 704, 501 S.W.2d 764, 766 (1973) (award
in suit by contractor "determined by the formula: contract price minus cost of perform-
ance equals profit."); Crankshaw v. Stanley Homes, Inc., 131 Ga. App. 840, 207 S.E.2d
241 (1974); Peru Assoc., Inc. v. State, 70 Misc. 2d 775, 777, 334 N.Y.S.2d 772, 776(N.Y. Ct. C1. 1971), af 'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 589, 335 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1972) (contractor
not in default recovers price less cost of performance); Farris v. Smith Erectors, Inc.,
516 S.W.2d 281, 283-84 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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contractor is the aggrieved party, expectancy damages may be calcu-
lated by subtracting the cost to complete from the contract price-here,
$22,000 from $40,000."s If progress payments have been made, they,
too, must be subtracted from the contract price to determine the expect-
ancy award."
Had Alice spent $15,000 on the job when she was ordered to with-
draw, and had the cost of completion been an additional $30,000,
expectancy damages would yield a $10,000 recovery, $5,000 less than
her cost. 0 Her position would be the same as if Bob had not breached
a contract favorable to him. An expectancy damage suit by Alice in
Problem 7, unlike Problem 6, would permit Bob to retain the benefit
of the bargain he had made. He would pay $10,000 for $15,000 worth
of work. A restitutionary remedy61 would permit Alice to recover any
gain Bob might have made on the contract, and would eliminate, as
well, any loss she might have suffered."2
On the original facts of Problem 7, Bob, having paid $18,000 in
expectancy damages to Alice, could employ another contractor to com-
plete the house. If he could find someone to complete the job for less
than $22,000, he would pay less for the house than the original $40,000
contract price. If the new contractor charged more than $22,000, Bob
would pay more than $40,000 for the house. In economic terms, there-
fore, Bob would be encouraged to breach if he believed that he could
find someone to finish the house for less than $22,000. And he would
be encouraged to perform the origin4l contract if he felt that it would
cost him more than $22,000 to complete it, which is likely to be the
case.
A second contractor employed to complete the structure would want
a reasonable profit on the balance of the work. Having paid Alice's
expected profits on the entire contract, Bob would then have to pay
the second contractor's profit on the remaining work. Bob, therefore,
would be unlikely to obtain the house for $40,000 or less, unless Alice's
costs were higher than her competitors. In building contracts, unlike
sales contracts, the system tends to pressure Bob to perform.
58. See note 57 supra.
59. See Farris v. Smith Erectors, Inc., 516 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
60. Id.
61. See notes 208-19 infra and accompanying text.
62. Id.
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Problem 8. The Contractor Breaches. Same fact pattern as Problem
7-$40,000 contract; $11,000 spent by contractor at the time of the
breach; a cost to Alice of $22,000 more to complete the job-except
that the contractor, Alice, breached.
Alice breached a contract favorable to her in that, had she completed
the job, she would have made a net profit of $7,000. For Bob to
achieve his expectancy, he must receive the house for $40,000. If
after reasonable efforts Bob could not find a second contractor to com-
plete the house for $40,000 or less, Alice would have to pay Bob the
difference between the second contract and $40,000.3 If Bob could
find -a second contractor to finish the house for $40,000 or less, Alice's
obligation to Bob would be limited to nominal damages.0 4  Thus, if a
second contractor agreed to complete the house for $30,000, the
expectancy damage system would call for a nominal damage award, and
Bob would obtain the house for $30,000 rather than the contracted
$40,000.
Since Alice breached the contract, the expectancy damage system is
unavailable to her.65 Absent any other remedy she would lose the
$11,000 she had spent before breaching as well as losing her expected
profit of $7,000. Even assuming she could recover under a restitution-
ary theory as a plaintiff in default,66 her maximum recovery would be
$10,000 if Bob's $30,000 expenditure to complete were reasonable.0 7
An award of more than $10,000 would force Bob to pay more than
$40,000 for the house, depriving him of his expectancy. At best, Alice
63. See Bell v. McCann, - Colo. App. -, -, 535 P.2d 233, 235 (1975) (damages
for contractor's failure to complete house equal to difference between contract cost and
fair market cost of completion); Palmer v. Howse, 133 Ga. App. 619, 619, 212 S.E.2d 2,
3 (1974) ("where a building contract is breached or abandoned . . . the measure of
damages is ordinarily the reasonable cost of completion"); Yonan v. Oak Park Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 27 Il. App. 3d 967, 976, 326 N.E.2d 773, 780-81 (1975) (fair market
cost of completion is "consistent measure of damages"); Louise Caroline Nursing Home,
Inc. v. Dix Constr. Corp., 362 Mass. 306, 311, 285 N.E.2d 904, 907-08 (1972).
64. Bob paid nothing to Alice and obtained a completed house for less than the
$40,000 contract price; he suffered no damages. See notes 33-34, 63 supra.
65. See Verran v. Blacklock, 60 Mich. App. 763, 768, 231 N.W.2d 544, 547 (1975).
But see Maraldo Asphalt Pay., Inc. v. Harry D. Osgood Co., 53 Mich. App. 324, 327-
28, 220 N.W.2d 50, 52 (1974) (subcontractor discharged for inadequate performance
awarded amount of savings made possible by his breach, denied recovery of full amount
of expenses before breach).
66. See notes 220-26 infra and accompanying text.
67. See Maraldo Asphalt Pay., Inc. v. Harry D. Osgood Co., 53 Mich. App.
324, 327-28, 220 N.W.2d 50, 52 (1974).
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would still lose $1,000 and her expected profit. Here again, the party
who makes a favorable contract is under substantial pressure to per-
form, with the risk of substantial economic loss accompanying any
breach.
2. The General Rule: Partial Breach
Problems 1 through 8 illustrate the operation of the expectancy
damage system when one party has completely repudiated a contract.
The details of the application of the expectancy rules differ somewhat
when the breach is partial, but the goal remains the same.
Problem 9. The Slightly Squeezed Lemon. Alice, a used car dealer,
and Bob, a schoolteacher, entered into a contract under which Alice was
to sell and Bob to buy a used 1971 Buick LeSabre for $2,900. The
market price for the car was $2,500. Bob paid Alice and took posses-
sion of the vehicle. Within a day the car's transmission "froze" and Bob
had it repaired for $250.
If Alice were liable to Bob for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability, s how much would Bob recover under the expectancy
system? Had Alice provided a car with a good transmission, Bob would
have received a $2,500 car for the $2,900 he paid Alice. He would
have lost $400 on the transaction. The car Bob received was worth
only $2,250, however, because of its defective transmission. If Bob
were awarded $250-the difference between the value of the car he
was promised ($2,500) and the value of the car delivered ($2,250)-
he would be left in as good or as bad a position as if Alice had not
breached. Section 2-714(2) of the Code codifies the common law in
permitting such a value-differential recovery.69
68, UNIFORM COMMERCUL CODE § 2-314.
69. See Courtesy Ford Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 53 Ala. App. 94, 100-01, 298 So. 2d
26, 32 (1974) (value of defect is measure of damages in new-car sale under § 2-714
(2)); Lee v. Air Care, Inc., 325 A.2d 598, 599 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974) (award of full
price to buyer of air conditioner that expelled warm rather than cool air; defect rendered
product valueless); Louis DeGidio Oil & Gas Burner Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Ace Eng'r
Co, - Minn. -, -, 225 N.W.2d 217, 222-23 (1974); Eckstein v. Cummins, 41
Ohio App. 2d 1, 16, 321 N.E.2d 897, 906-07 (1974) (breach of new-car warranty);
Swenson v. Chevron Chem. Co., - S.D. -, -, 234 N.W.2d 38, 44 (1975) (award of
full cont act price of ineffective insecticide, "worth nothing" because of defect, citing
U.C.C. § 2-714(2)). In Ricklefs v. Clemens, 216 Kan. 128, 531 P.2d 94 (1975), a
stolen car was sold to plaintiff by defendant, who had no knowledge that the car was
stolen. The plaintiff kept the vehicle for a long period of time both before and after
he was informed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the car was stolen. In
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The value-differential assessment of damages ignores the spread
between market price and contract price. Although Bob would receive
$250 in damages, he would still sustain the $400 loss resulting from the
bad bargain he originally made. Although required to pay $250 in
damages, Alice would retain $150 of the advantage she gained in mak-
ing an over-market sale. If Alice had repudiated the contract and re-
fused to deliver the car to Bob, nominal damages would be awarded.70
Bob would be relieved of his bad bargain, and Alice would lose the
benefit of the bargain she made.
The differing results seem irreconcilable. The value-differential
award is within the expectancy framework, while the nominal damage
award for total breach ignores expectancy and causes the seller to lose
the benefit of her bargain.
Another illustration of the expectancy system's treatment of partial
performance is found in construction contract cases. Building con-
tracts, almost by necessity, tend to be performed imperfectly." In re-
sponse, the expectancy system developed the doctrine of substantial
performance for suits "on the contract,"7 2 and "quantum meruit" or
"plaintiff-in-default" theories for suits "off the contract." 3
Problem 10. The Tar Paper. Alice, a contractor, entered a written
agreement with Bob under which Alice agreed to build a house for Bob
according to plans and specifications provided by him. The price was
set at $62,500, with progress payments to be made; Bob was to with-
hold 20%, or $12,500, until he moved into the house and found that
all specifications had been met. Bob moved in but refused to pay the
balance to Alice, claiming that Alice had failed to meet the specifica-
tions in the following particulars:
assessing damages, the court applied the loss of value test of § 2-714(2), but held that
in the circumstances the valuation should have been made as of the time the buyer
learned that the car was stolen rather than the time the car was delivered. See also
Cambern v. Bubbling, -- Minn. -, -, 238 N.W.2d 622, 625 (1976) (not exclusive
remedy, not applicable to sale of sick calves).
70. See notes 33-34 supra.
71. See Dittmer v. Nokleberg, 219 N.W.2d 201, 206 (N.D. 1974).
72. See Lowy v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 87, 94, 429 P.2d 577, 580-81,
102 Cal. Rptr. 474, 477-78 (1967); Reynolds v. Armstead, 166 Colo. 372, 375-76, 443
P.2d 990, 991-92 (1968) (dicta: contractor's failure to substantially perform deprived
him of the right to recover under express contract theory).
73. See Nordin Constr. Co. v. City of Nome, 489 P.2d 455, 465-66 n.14 (Alas.
1971) (contractor who fails to perform substantially may recover the value of the "bene-
fit" conferred by partial performance); Kreyer v. Driscoll, 39 Wis. 2d 540, 544, 159
N.W.2d 680, 683 (1968). But see Triple M. Roofing Corp. v. Greater Jericho Corp., 43
App. Div. .d 594, 349 NY.S.2d 771 (1973).
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(i) Absence of weather stripping for the cellar door and the win-
dows in the basement and attic;
(ii) Improper grading of the lot;
(iii) Failure to provide a screen door for the basement;
(iv) Leaving a structural defect in the living room ceiling causing
it to crack;
(v) Failure to install solid-core doors throughout the house;
(vi) Failure to provide a Lodge batting (insulating sheet around the
entire house) and substituting two sheets of tar paper in lieu of
the Lodge batting.
Alice conceded the defects, and the parties stipulated that it would cost
$9,000 to repair defects (i) through (v); that it would cost $78,500
to install the Lodge batting because the entire structure would have to
be torn down and rebuilt; that it would cost $4,500 to insulate the house
with a foam insulation equivalent to Lodge batting; that the house with
all six defects had a market value of $60,000; that the house without
defects and insulated either with Lodge batting or foam would have been
worth $68,000.
If Alice made a "good faith"' 74 effort to perform the contract and if
her performance were "substantial," 5 she could recover the contract
price minus either the cost to complete, i.e., repair the defects, 7 or the
difference in value between the house Bob would have received had
Alice performed fully and the house Bob actually received.7 7  The
74. Good faith is often said to be a condition of a finding of substantial perform-
ance. See Low-y v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 67 Cal. 2d 87, 92-93, 429 P.2d 577, 580-81
(1967); Watson Lumber Co. v. Mouser, 30 IM. App. 3d 100, 105, 333 N.E.2d 19, 26
(1975); Gamble v. Woodlea Constr. Co., 246 Md. 260, 264, 228 A.2d 243, 245 (1967);
Dittmer v, Nokleberg, 219 N.W.2d 201, 210 (N.D. 1974); Perryman v. Sims, 506 S.W.
2d 753, 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. See Nordin Constr. Co. v. City of Nome, 489 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Alas. 1971).
76. See Fenner & Shea Constr. Co. v. Wadlkins, 32 Colo. App. 364, 366, 511 P.2d
924, 925 (1973); Royal Ornamental Iron, Inc. v. Devon Bank, 32 Ill. App. 3d 101, 108,
336 N.E.2d 105, 111 (1975); Gamble v. Woodlea Constr. Co., 246 Md. 260, 264-65,
228 A.2d 243, 245-46 (1967); Graham Constr. Co. v. Walker Process Equipment, Inc.,
422 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967 writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt.
467, 470. 346 A.2d 210, 211-12 (1975) (cost-to-repair test in breach of implied warranty
on new home); Stevens Constr. Corp. v. Carolina Corp., 63 Wis. 2d 342, 359-60, 217
N.W.2d 291, 300-01 (1974).
77. The value-differential test is applied when the cost to repair the defects is un-
reasonably high compared with the economic gain that would result. See Oven Dev.
Corp. v. Molisky, 278 So. 2d 299, 303-04 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973); Odgers v. Held, 58
Wash. 247, 251, 362 P.2d 261, 263-64 (1961); W.G. Slugg Seed & Fertilizer, Inc. v.
P. ul en Lumber, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 220, 227, 214 N.W.2d 413, 416-17 (1974). See also
Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 471, 346 A.2d 210,-212 (1975). (value-differential test
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value-differential test normally is used when the economic benefit of
making the repairs would be far less than their cost, i.e., when the re-
pairs would amount to economic waste.78
As applied to Problem 10, a strict cost-to-repair test would require
Alice to pay $78,500 to install Lodge batting. Because of the economic
waste in such repairs and the availability of the cheaper foam alterna-
tive, the cost-to-repair formula probably would yield $4,500 to Bob for
the insulation plus $9,000 for repairing defects (i) through (v), or a
total of $13,500. Since Alice was entitled to the $12,500 balance of
the contract price, her liability to Bob would be the $1,000 difference
between the contract price and the cost to repair.
If all of the repairs were made, the value of the house would be
increased only $8,000. It seems economically wasteful to spend
$13,500 to increase the value by $8,000. Under the value-differential
test, if Alice did perform substantially, Bob's recovery would be limited
to $8,000. Since he otherwise owed Alice the $12,500 balance of the
contract price, Alice would be entitled to a $4,500 recovery against
Bob.
If Alice did not meet the test of substantial performance her right
to recover would be "off the contract." Unless Bob were forced to
pay the difference between the value of what he received from Alice
and the amount already paid, Alice would forfeit the value of the work
done and create a windfall for Bob.70
Since Bob was the aggrieved party, any recovery by Alice should
leave him in no worse a position than he would have occupied had
Alice performed as promised. Bob's theory of recovery, whether per-
formance was substantial or less than substantial, remains the same.
In some courts, the damage award arising from the contract in Prob-
lem 10 would be the same whether or not the court finds substantial
performance."' Without substantial performance Alice would not be en-
titled to the contract price as a starting point; but Bob's damages remain
tied to the contract price. If the value-differential test were used, Bob
recovering the $8,000 difference in value, Alice would be entitled to
$4,500 to avoid a windfall to Bob and a forfeiture by Alice. If the
under an implied warranty of freedom from structural defects in sale of newly con-
structed homes). In Dittmer v. Nokleberg, 219 N.W.2d 201, 203 (N.D. 1974), the syl-
labus states a general rule that North Dakota courts assess damages in substantial per-
formance cases by the value-differential test.
78. See note 77 supra. Problem 10 is patterned after Glazer v. Schwartz, 276 Mass.
54, 176 N.E. 613 (1931).
79. See note 73 supra; notes 220-26 infra and accompanying text.
80. See Peters v. Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 59-60, 152 N.W.2d 103, 109 (1967); Burke
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$13,500 cost-to-repair figure were awarded to Bob, he would recover
$1,000 from Alice.
Although many courts sharply distinguish between substantial per-
formance and less than substantial performance, the distinction often
has little effect on the amount recovered. Damage awards tend to be
the same-although arrived at by different routes-whether or not sub-
stantial performance is found.
3. General Comments on the General Rule
While the expectancy system is designed to aid the aggrieved party,
the system, absent consequential or incidental damages and other com-
plicating factors, often places both the injured party and the breaching
party in the position they would have occupied had the contract been
performed. The system applies pressure to perform only on the party
favored by the contract, the party least likely to breach."1
While the system tends to take the profit out of breaching, it rarely
encourages performance. Having made an unfavorable contract, a
party may perform or breach with the same monetary result. Breach
well may be more profitable. Because of the cost of litigation, the
aggrieved party may settle for less than expectancy, although the
breaching party also may have to pay significant legal fees. And, of
course, if the market and contract prices are nearly equal-which
describes most contracts-only nominal damages are available.
When the parties to a contract desire a continuing relationship-a
desire that probably dominates the commercial world-there is sub-
stantial empirical evidence that neither side asserts its legal rights.82
Each adjusts to the other's problems. Pressure to perform from outside
the commercial world is largely unnecessary. It is unlikely that the
expectancy system's role is much more significant than providing guide-
lines for settling disputes when the parties desire a continuing relation-
ship. In this context, the neutrality of the expectancy system seems
rational.
v. McKee, 304 P.2d 307, 308-09 (Okla. 1956), both relying on Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H.
481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834). Contra, Triple M. Roofing Corp. v. Greater Jericho
Corp., 43 App. Div. 2d 594, 349 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (1973). RESTATEMENT OF CON-
TRACTS § 357 (1932) recognizes the right of a plaintiff in default to recover a net bene-
fit conferred on the aggrieved party, but limits the right to cases in which the breach
is not "wilful and deliberate."
81. But see note 29 supra. Transaction costs--overhead, time and effort spent in
arranging the original contract-also are wasted if the contract is not performed.
82. See note 29 supra.
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In many cases, however, one or the other of the parties is less
interested in a continuing relationship than in the immediate profit to
be found in a breach.83 In such cases, performance in the absence of
pressure from the legal system or an advantageous contract is unlikely;
legal sanctions are necessary to discourage breach. The expectancy
damage system provides no such sanction; nor does it encourage per-
formance. In short, the expectancy damage system works well only
when it is not needed-in contracts in which commercial pressures
for continuing relationships lead the parties to perform or mutually
adjust their differences. The system is least satisfactory when it is most
needed-when the commercial relationship is subordinate to a quick
profit.
In view of its apparent lack of utility, why has the expectancy damage
system persisted for so long? Professor Corbin suggests two justifica-
tions for -the system: keeping the peace, and deterring future breaches.84
The "keeping-the-peace" analysis applies to all judicial remedies; con-
tract disputes could be resolved by money damage systems other than
the expectancy system. And as noted, the expectancy system rarely de-
ters breach by a party who has made an unfavorable contract, at least
absent consequential or incidental damages. In fact, the system may
encourage breach by a party who hopes to achieve a favorable settle-
ment.
Another argument in favor of the expectancy system is that a party
entering a contract, being assured of receiving the expectancy, is en-
couraged to engage in other economic activity in reliance on receiving
the expectancy.8 5 The argument assumes that the amount of expec-
tancy damages the party will receive are relatively certain, an erroneous
assumption in many cases. 80 Litigation costs and delays also may re-
duce the net amount received by the aggrieved party. If damages were
83. While continuing relationships tend to dominate many commercial areas, a great
many transactions involve speculators only briefly engaged. Most transactions in which
one or both of the parties are not "merchants" under the Uniform Commercial Code
probably involve casual rather than continuing relationships.
84. 5 A. CoRniN, ConmN ON CoNTRACTs 33-34 (1964).
85. [ilt gradually becomes apparent, upon a broad survey of the law of reme-
dies, that "contracts" are not "enforced" merely because the parties made them,
but that the law affords only such remedies for breach of promise as seem most
likely to promote the orderly and efficient conduct of the community's eco-
nomic life.
Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HAnv. L. REV. 1,
32 (1932). But cf. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Efficiency, 24 RUTGERs L Rnv. 273, 284-86 (1970).
86. mhe aim in view is to put the injured party in as good a position as he
would have had if performance had been rendered as promised. It goes with-
out saying that this aim can never be exactly attained. The position that one
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/1
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sufficient to deter breach, the parties could rely on performance rather
than a damage award. If damages are too high, however, parties might
be deterred from entering contracts at all.87 A balance between the
extremes should be possible.
The traditional contract-consideration system, including the expect-
ancy component, developed in the late 19th century when laissez-faire
was at its height.88 In that tradition the goal was to establish a system
with a minimum of state intervention."9 The fewest possible prom-
ises were to be enforced and the smallest possible damages awarded. 90
Whatever the historical explanation, it is difficult to understand why the
damage portion of the system has persisted in the absence of demon-
strated commercial utility. One explanation may be that the commer-
cial world still favors minimal government action-an attitude perhaps
held by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code, which incorpor-
ated the expectancy system. Another possibility, suggested by Profes-
sor Gilmore, is that the system has not in fact persisted and is now
in the process of dying.9' A final explanation-and perhaps the most
accurate-is that no alternative to the traditional expectancy damage
system has appeared and that the system persists for the lack of a satis-
factory substitute.
1Il. FORESEEABILITY-
CONSEQUENTIAL OR SPECIAL DAMAGES
The consequences of a breach of contract may extend well beyond
would have occupied if history had been different is purely hypothetical. And
yet that is the problem that the trial court and jury are required to solve. They
must determine what additions to the injured party's wealth (expected gains)
have been prevented by the breach and what subtractions from his wealth
(losses) have been caused by it. The working rules of law by which court and
jury are directed are never capable of exact and perfect application. Not all
of the court decisions can be reconciled with any set of rules; and in innumera-
ble case3 the courts have seemed to avoid the statement of any rule by which
the result reached can be explained.
5 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRAC-S 5-6 (1964).
87. Hartzler, The Business and Economic Functions of the Law of Contract Dam-
ages, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 387, 392 (1968).
88. GILMORE 6-7, quoting L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACr LAW IN AMERICA 20-24 (1965).
89. GILMORE 6-7, quoting L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 88, at 94-96.
90. GILMORE 14. Describing the Holmes-Wiliston view, Gilmore says:
The theory seems to have been dedicated to the proposition that, ideally, no
one should be liable to anyone for anything. Since the ideal was not attain-
able, the compromise solution was to restrict liability within the narrowest
possible limits.
Id. See also id. at 65-66.
91. See generally GILMORE.
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the loss of the contracted performance. The failure of a used car
dealer to deliver a $1,000 car as promised may prevent the buyer from
getting his pregnant wife to the hospital in time for the child to be
delivered; as a result, the child may die, the mother have a nervous
breakdown, and the father take to alcohol and lose his job. If
the buyer of the car is to achieve as good a position as if the dealer
had delivered the car as promised, an award of something more than
the market-price-contract-price differential is necessary. The tradi-
tional expectancy system sharply limits awards of such consequential
damages through the general rule that the party who breaches a con-
tract is liable only for those damages the parties reasonably should have
foreseen on the basis of facts known to them when the contract was
made.92
92. See Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmnt., Inc., 519
F.2d 634, 640 (8th Cir. 1975) (award of lost profits to charity for breach of contract
by fund-raising company); Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 512 F.2d 365,
368 (2d Cir. 1975) (recovery of lost profits); St. Clair v. Local 515, Teamsters, 422
F.2d 128, 132 (6th Cir. 1969) (no liability for humiliation and loss of home to mort-
gage holder, resulting from unfair representation of employee by union); Walther & Cie
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 397 F. Supp. 937, 944-45 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (fluc-
tuation of the German mark was reasonably foreseeable, to be taken into account in as-
sessing damages for failure to pay a sum certain when due); Alex v. Henry S. Conrey,
Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1147, 1151-52 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1975)
(damages limited on ground that action taken and costs incurred after breach were not
foreseeable); Jones Mem. Trust v. Tsai Inv. Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491, 499
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (only general damages allowed unless special are made known); Au-
trey v. Chemtrust Indus. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085, 1093-94 (D. Del. 1973) (Illinois
foreseeability test applied to deny recovery for damages to reputation and loss of good
will in a breach of warranty action); For Children, Inc. v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 352 F.
Supp. 1280, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (award of lost profits on ground that the parties con-
templated retail sale of the entire order); United States v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 339 F.
Supp. 18, 24-25 (S.D.W. Va. 1972) (foreseeable consequential damages usually awarded,
here denied because of contract provision barring such awards); Hawkins v. Delta Spin-
dle, Inc., 245 Ark. 830, 434 S.W.2d 825 (1968) (applying foreseeability test to deny
recovery for loss of use of a machine which the party who breached knew was used for
custom harvesting); A.A. Baxter Corp. v. Colt Indus., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 144, 155, 88
Cal. Rptr. 842, 848-49 (1970) (foreseeability test permits assessment of damages for de-
lay in delivering machinery to a subcontractor); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Goudie, 290
A.2d 826, 832-33 (D.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972) (lost profits
deemed foreseeable by vendor who knew buyer of inadequate air conditioning system
planned to install it in a coffee house); Olson v. Quality-Pak Co., 93 Idaho 607, 610-
11, 469 P.2d 45, 48-49 (1970) (contractor liable for delay in construction of a potato
cellar which foreseeably caused frost damage to potato crop); DeWaay v. Muhr, 160
N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa 1968) (breach of contract to plant, grow and deliver popcorn;
possibility of lost profits sufficiently foreseeable to present a jury question); Cain v.
Grosshans & Petersen, Inc., 196 Kan. 497, 501, 413 P.2d 98, 101-02 (1966) (failure
to remove earth from plaintiff's land for use in the construction of a highway; no award
for loss of fenced-in lake which performance would have made possible); State Farm
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The foreseeability limitation on expectancy awards stems from the
early case of Hadley v. Baxendale,93 which discussed the limitation as
follows:
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken,
the damages which the other party ought to receive. should be such
as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e.,
according to the usual course of things, from the breach of contract
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the con-
templation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the
probable result of the breach of it."'
In explaining why damages were limited to those within the contem-
plation of the parties at the time of contract, the Hadley court said:
[Hiad the special circumstances been known, the parties might have
specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 758, 527 P.2d 798, 799 (1974) ("None of the
claimed damages were the natural and foreseeable consequences of the claimed breach,
and, thus, were not within the contemplation of the parties. Therefore, we hold that
an action based on breach of contract does not lie"); Perkins v. Langdon, 237 N.C.
159, 171. 74 S.E.2d 634, 743-44 (1953) (permitting recovery of lost profits in the oper-
ation of a tobacco warehouse by plaintiff-lessee who lost the lease as a result of lessor's
sale of the warehouse to a third person); Kline Iron & Steel Co. v. Superior Trucking
Co., 261 S.C. 542, 548-49, 201 S.E.2d 388, 391 (1973) (common carrier held liable
for loss caused by delay in shipment of steel since carrier had notice at time of contract
of the need for promptness); Pareira v. Wehner, 133 Vt. 74, 78-79, 330 A.2d 84, 86-
87 (1974) (recovery of survey and redesign costs by buyer when seller conveyed less
land than promised); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 215 Va. 796, 802-
03, 214 S.E.2d 155, 160-62 (1975) (interest for added time, but not increase in the inter-
est rate, includible among damages due to contractor's delay in completion); Wilkins v.
Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 71 Wash. 2d 178, 187, 427 P.2d 716, 721-22 (1967)
(awxaid of $43.734 for eight-month delay in an operation, breach of medical service
plan).
93. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). Hadley v. Baxendale and the Hadley doctrine
are slill cited with some frequency. See Karlen v. Butler Mfg. Co., 526 F.2d 1373, 1379
(8th Cir. 1975); Stanish v. Polish Roman Cath. Union of Am., 484 F.2d 713, 724 (7th
Cir. 1973 1; Dubern v. Girard Trust Bank, 454 F.2d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1972); F.J. Mc-
Carthy Co. v. Southern Pac. Co., 428 F.2d 690, 693 (9th Cir. 1970); Crawford v. Pitts-
burgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 386 F. Supp. 290, 294 (D. Wyo. 1974); Eazor Express,
Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 376 F. Supp. 841, 844 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Walker
Mfg. Co. v. Henkel Constr. Co., 346 F. Supp. 621, 634-35 (N.D. Iowa 1972); United
States v. Marietta Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 18, 24 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); ERA Helicopter,
Inc. v. Digicon Alaska, Inc., 518 P.2d 1057, 1060 (Alas. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Goudie, 290 A.2d 826, 832 (D.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049 (1972);
Strong v. Commercial Carpet Co., - Ind. App. -, -, 322 N.E.2d 387, 392 (1975);
Bumann v. Maurer, 203 N.W.2d 434, 440 (N.D. 1972); Ligon v. Chas. P. Davis Hard-
ware, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle
& Russell, Inc., 215 Va. 796, 801 n.4, 214 S.E.2d 155, 160 n.4 (1975); Kentucky Fried
Chicken v. Sellaro, - W. Va. -, -, 214 S.E.2d 823, 828 (1975).
94. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. 1845).
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damages in that case; and of this advantage it would be very unjust to
deprive them.95
The "special provision" rationale enunciated in Hadley contemplates
a knowing assumption of the risk. With the necessary information
available prior to entering a contract, a party knowing of the potential
consequences of a breach will be able to take self-protective action.
Such action might involve such things as obtaining or increasing insur-
ance coverage, raising the price, limiting liability by contract, or per-
haps simply deciding not to enter the contract.
Expectancy damages are divided into two categories: general and
special. 98 While Hadley appeared to lay down a different rule for gen-
eral and for special damages, the inquiry for both is identical:
From facts known before or at the time of entering the contract, what
damages should the parties reasonably have foreseen arising from a
breach?97  As the Hadley rule developed, parties who breached were
held responsible, not only for consequences actually foreseen at the
time of contracting, but also for consequences they reasonably should
have foreseen at that time.98 American courts took a conservative view
of the consequences a person reasonably should have foreseen.90
English courts attributed more imagination to the parties.100
95. Id. at 151.
96. The UCC term is "consequential." See note 18 supra.
97. See, e.g., DeWaay v. Muhr, 160 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Iowa 1968).
98. See Jones Mem. Trust v. Tsai Inv. Servs., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co., 150 Cal. 51, 56, 87 P. 1093, 1095(1906); Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 71 Wash. 2d 178, 186, 427 P.2d
716, 721-22 (1967). See also note 92 supra.
99. See Stanish v. Polish Roman Cath. Union of Am., 484 F.2d 713, 724-26 (7th
Cir. 1973); Alex v. Henry S. Conrey, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1147, 1151-52 (E.D. Pa. 1974),
aff'd, 511 F.2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1975); Jones Mem. Trust v. Tsai Inv. Servs., Inc., 367
F. Supp. 491, 499 (S.D.N..Y 1973); Hawkins v. Delta Spindle, Inc., 245 Ark. 230, 434
S.W.2d 825 (1968); F & B Ceco, Inc. v. Galaxy Studios, Inc., 201 So. 2d 597, 598-99
(Fla. Ct. App. 1967); Cain v. Grosshans & Peterson, Inc., 196 Kan. 497, 501, 413 P.2d
98, 101-02 (1966); Baker v. Riverside Church of God, 61 Tenn. App. 270, 288-91, 453
S.W.2d 801, 809-11 (1970); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Bettes, 407 S.W.2d 307, 316-
17 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell,
Inc., 215 Va. 796, 803-04, 214 S.E.2d 155, 161-62 (1975). For expansive applications
of the foreseeability doctrine, see Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising
Mgmnt., Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 639-43 (8th Cir. 1975); Walther & Cie v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 397 F. Supp. 937, 944-45 (M.D. Pa. 1975); For Children, Inc.
v. Graphics Int'l, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1280, 1284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Goudie, 290 A.2d 826, 832-34 (D.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1049
(1972).
100. See, e.g., The Heron II (Koufos v. C. Czarnikow, Ltd.), [1967] 3 All E.R. 686
(H.L.); Victoria Laundry v. Newman Indu5. Ltd., [19491 1 All E.R. 997 (Ct. App.).
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The drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code adopted the common
law's "reason-to-know" doctrine,' but thought it desirable to modify
what they viewed as the "liberality of that rule. . . by refusing to per-
mit recovery unless the buyer could not reasonably have prevented the
loss by cover or otherwise."' 0 2 At common law, general damages nor-
mally were available without regard to the buyer's "cover" activity,10 3
but special damages were restricted by the foreseeability and mitigation
doctrines.' It is therefore doubtful that the Code's limitation on con-
sequential damages is more conservative than the rule at common law.
The Code does restrict consequential damages to aggrieved buyers, and
denies consequential damages to aggrieved sellers, 10 5 a major departure
from the rule of Hadley.
Problem 11. Lost Profits. Alice, a manufacturer, and Bob, a jobber,
entered a written contract under which Alice agreed to manufacture and
sell to Bob, and Bob agreed to buy, 200,000 specially threaded bolts
for $20,000, the market price for such bolts. Delivery was to be made
30 days after the contract was signed. At the time they entered the
contract, Alice was aware that Bob had ordered the bolts to fulfill a con-
tractual obligation to Clara to provide the 200,000 specially threaded
bolts for $22,000. Alice repudiated the contract on the day she was
to make delivery.
As soon as Bob informed Clara of his inability to deliver the bolts
as promised, Clara contracted with an out-of-town manufacturer who
agreed to produce and deliver 200,000 specially threaded bolts in 20
days. Clara was forced to pay $25,000 for the bolts to ensure such
101. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2).
102. Id., Comment 2.
103. See Reliance Cooperage Corp. v. Treat, 195 F.2d 977, 982-83 (8th Cir. 1952)
(anticipatory breach by seller of a contract to deliver barrel staves; aggrieved buyer was
entitled to the market-price-contract-price differential as of the date the seller should have
performed although the aggrieved buyer took no action upon learning of the repudia-
tion); Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co., 102 F. Supp. 354, 363-64 (E.D. Ark.
1951), modificd on other grounds, 199 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1952) (market-price-contract-
price award despite absence of cover efforts).
104. See Stanley v. Tinsman, 159 Me. 17, 18-19, 187 A.2d 401, 403 (1963); Rich v.
Bongiovanni, 4 N.J. Super. 243, 247-50, 66 A.2d 888, 891-92 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1949); Sellers v. Orona, 58 N.M. 53, 54-55, 265 P.2d 369, 370-71 (1954); Czarnikow-
Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 255 N.Y. 33, 42-47, 173 N.E. 913, 915-17
(1930).
105. Section 2-715 applies only to buyer's remedies and the Code contains no com-
parable consequential-damage provision relating to the seller. Section 1-106 appears to
restrict consequenlial damages to those authorized by § 2-715: "[Nleither consequential
or special . . . damages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by
other rule of law." UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-106.
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rapid delivery. As the result of the temporary bolt shortage, Clara was
forced to close her plant for 15 days and lost $40,000 in profits. When
Bob contracted with Clara, he knew she had few bolts on hand and
understood that if he failed to supply the bolts as promised, it was likely
that she would be forced to shut down production. Alice was unaware
of the bolt shortage until after she repudiated the contract.
If the contract between Alice and Bob were viewed in isolation, Bob
would be entitled to nominal damages, the market and contract
prices being the same.10 The second contract between Bob and Clara,
however, complicates the analysis. Had Alice performed as promised,
Bob would have made a $2,000 profit from his resale to Clara. When
she agreed to manufacture the bolts, Alice knew of Bob's obligation
to Clara, and so would be liable to Bob for the $2,000 loss of profits,
under the common law test10 7 or the consequential damage test of
section 2-715(2) of the Code.' Apart from Bob's possible liability
to Clara, the $2,000 award would put him in as good a position as if
Alice had performed.
Whether Alice would view her breach as costly would depend on
whether she could have produced the bolts for more or less than
$22,000. If Alice's cost to manufacture the bolts were $1,000 less than
106. See note 33 supra.
107. See Tomlinson v. Wander Seed & Bulb Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 462, 472, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 310, 316 (1960) (resale by purchaser within contemplation of both parties, failure
of seller to deliver causes loss of prospective profits); Smith v. A.A. Wood & Son Co.,
103 Ga. App. 802, 809, 120 S.E.2d 800, 805 (1961) (dicta: lost profits may constitute
a proper element of damages if when the contract was made they were within the con-
templation of the parties as a probable result of the breach); Jennings v. Lamb, 201
Tenn. 1, 7-8, 296 S.W.2d 828, 831 (1956) (knowledge that buyer is a dealer in the goods
being sold sufficient to charge breaching seller with special damages based on lost re-
sales). See also Narried v. Johnson, 339 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960):
The law in Texas is well settled that, where the buyer of productive machinery
is prevented or incapacitated from doing business for a considerable period of
time by reason of seller's failure to make delivery within the time agreed upon,
he can recover any lost profits that were within the contemplation of the par-
ties and which can be established with requisite certainty.
Id. at 568.
108. See Hoefferle Truck Sales v. Divco-Wayne, 523 F.2d 543, 550-51 (7th Cir.
1975) (automobile dealers awarded lost resale profits resulting from the failure of a
truck manufacturer to deliver trucks); Lake Village Implement Co. v. Cox, 252 Ark.
224, 230-31, 478 S.W.2d 36, 41-42 (1972); Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am. v. Sonus
Corp., 362 Mass. 246, 262-64, 284 N.E. 880, 889-90 (1972); Gulf Chem. & Metal
Corp. v. Sylvan Chem. Corp., 122 NJ. Super. 499, 505-06, 300 A.2d 878, 882 (Super.
Ct. L. Div.), aff'd, 126 N.J. Super. 261, 314 A.2d 73 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973); Har-
bor Hill Litho. Corp. v. Dittler Bros., Inc., 76 Misc. 2d 145, 146-48, 348 N.Y.S.2d 920,
923-24 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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the $20,000 contract price, her breach would cost her the $1,000 profit
she would have made plus the $2,000 consequential damage award to
Bob, or a total of $3,000. If her costs to produce the bolts were $22,000,
performance would bring the same loss she would have suffered by paying
the $2,000 to Bob. And if her costs of production were $25,000, Alice's
profit from her breach would be $3,000. She would have saved a
$5,000 loss by refusing to fulfill her commitment to Bob, at the expense
of a $2,000 award of consequential damages to Bob. The system
would encourage Alice to breach.
Alice's breach, however, would cause Bob a loss substantially
in excess of $2,000. Bob's failure to deliver the bolts to Clara
forced her to the open market where, acting reasonably, she covered
for $25,000, or $3,000 more than the $22,000 price she was to pay to
Bob. Under section 2-712 of the Code, Bob would be liable to Clara
for the $3,000 difference between the cover price and the contract
price.1"9  Could Bob recover this $3,000 from Alice? Section
2-715(2) of the Code would permit Bob to recover "any loss resulting
from .. . particular requirements and needs of which . . . [Alice] at
the time of contracting had reason to know. . . ."110 At the time of
contracting, Alice knew that Bob had contracted to resell the bolts to
Clara and that the bolts were specially threaded and thus unlikely to
be readily available. She did not know that Clara's inventory of bolts
was extremely low. Under section 2-715,"' Bob probably could
recover the $3,000 from Alice, if Alice knew or had reason to know
that Bob would be liable for Clara's extra costs in obtaining replace-
ment bolts. The assumption is that Alice would have known that
Bob would be liable to Clara for reasonable action Clara took to acquire
substitute bolts. (Under the common law the result would have been
less certain.) 12 If Alice were aware of the potential cost of breach,
the system would tend to deter Alice from breaching even when she
made an unfavorable contract, unless, of course, the contract was so
unfavorable that it would cost her more than $25,000 to produce the
bolts.
Bob may be liable to Clara for more than $3,000."-' When he
contracted with Clara, Bob knew of the short supply of bolts she had
109. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-712.
110. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2)(a).
I11. See note 108 supra.
112. See notes 107-08 supra.
113. See note 107 supra.
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on hand and understood the likelihood of a shutdown if he failed to
supply the bolts as promised. With such knowledge Bob probably
would be liable to Clara for the $40,000 loss she suffered as the result
of shutting down production."'
An award of $43,000 to Clara would meet her expectancy in
her contract with Bob. For Bob to achieve his expectancy, how-
ever, he should recover $45,000 from Alice-$2,000 in lost profits and
$43,000 in damages to Clara. It is extremely unlikely that Alice would
be liable to Bob for Clara's $40,000 in lost profits. Alice was unaware
of the bolt shortage when she contracted with Bob, and consequently
had no reason to believe that Clara would be forced to shut down
production.1 '
Bob probably would recover $5,000 from Alice and pay Clara
$43,000 in damages. Clara would receive her expectancy; Alice
would suffer a mild loss from breaching, the extent of her loss
depending on whether she had a favorable or unfavorable contract with
Bob. Bob, as the aggrieved party in his contract with Alice and the
breaching party in his contract with Clara, would suffer a severe loss
because his knowledge base was broader than Alice's.
Because the consequential damage portion of the system depends on
foreseeability, an aggrieved party such as Bob may suffer substantial
uncompensated losses because of another's breach. Alice's fore-
sight-not Bob's-limits the amount of recovery. Although it is
often said that the expectancy damage system is not penal, the fore-
seeable-consequences portion of the system imposes a sanction on the
aggrieved party for failure to make known the consequences of a
breach. Unless the information necessary to support liability is made
known before or at the time of contracting, the party aggrieved by the
breach will not be compensated fully for the loss suffered. The fore-
seeability limitation thus often inhibits the goal of putting the aggrieved
party in as good a position as if the contract were performed. With
the limitation, the system often fails to compensate the aggrieved party
for losses suffered; the system limits damages to an amount the breach-
ing party might anticipate if that party had speculated about damages
when the contract was made.
114. The issue, of course, is whether Bob's knowledge was such that he should be
charged with full damages.
115. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. MITIGATION-POST-BREACH DUTIES OF THE
AGGRIEVED PARTY
The mitigation doctrine is an integral part of the traditional expect-
ancy damage system. Under the doctrine, breach of contract-while
it may relieve the nonbreaching party of further obligation to perform
as promised'I 6 -imposes two duties on such an aggrieved party: First,
to take all reasonable action to reduce damages (to mitigate); 117 and
116. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS ch. 11 (1932).
117. See McCumin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 477 F.2d 113, 116 (5th Cir. 1973) (custom-
er's suit against broker for buying cotton futures for customer's account above the price
authorized by the customer; mitigation accomplished by customer's prompt direction that
the futures be sold); Gurney Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d
588, 596-97 (4th Cir. 1972) (breach of contract to build a yam-spinning mill for plain-
tiff; plasntiff mitigated by permitting supplier's employees to attempt to make the equip-
ment work); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 465 F.2d 1382, 1388 (8th Cir.
1972) UCC case in which consequential damages were denied on the ground that lessee
of TV equipment failed to take reasonable steps to minimize damages); Courtland v.
Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076, 1079-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (investor barred from
claiming damages resulting from a stockbroker's failure to buy shares as instructed; in-
vestor was obliged to mitigate by buying the shares elsewhere); Wurlitzer Co. v. Oliver,
334 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (UCC case in which vendor who resold items
as a unit rather than separately was held to have acted in good faith for the purpose
of realizing "the greatest sum to be applied in mitigation of damages"); United States
v. Stack. 308 F. Supp. 46, 49 (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd, 420 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1970) (con-
tract to clear land in Arlington National Cemetery; subcontractor who made no effort
to iecmove and sell felled logs not permitted to claim lost profits from contemplated sale
of logs); C.J. Langenfelder & Son, Inc. v. United States, 384 F.2d 1005, 1006-07 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) (mitigation duty does not require a contractor to take impractical and un-
economical steps to convert unsuitable soil into useful material); Madison County Bd.
of Educ. v. Wigley, 288 Ala. 202, 210, 259 So. 2d 233, 239 (1972) (tenure statute re-
lieves teacher, dismissed in violation of statute, of obligation to seek other employment
to mitigate damages); University of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234, 1239-40 (Alas.
1974) (teacher dismissed from tenured position required to seek alternative employ-
ment); Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ellsworth, 103 Ariz. 515, 520, 446 P.2d 458, 461
(1968) (lessee obliged to seek alternative sources of barley and wheat after learning of
breach of pasturage contract); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1103, 449 S.W.2d 922,
927 (1970) (damages for water seepage reduced because owner did not permit con-
tractor to install an automatic sump pump which would have reduced damages, but
would not have eliminated the problem); Cherokee Inv. Co. v. Voiles, 166 Colo. 270,
277, 443 P.2d 727, 730 (1968) (buyers of defective water conditioner satisfied the duty
to mitigate by repeated efforts to persuade the seller to repair); Nash v. Hoopes, 332
A 2d 411. 414 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (buyer's reasonable efforts to find financing for
replacement purchase sufficient to sustain award of lost profits on seller's breach of land
contract); Katz v. Exclusive Auto Leasing, Inc., 282 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. Super. CL
1971) (evidence about car leasing company's disposition of car returned to the lessor
before expiration of lease held admissible); Industrial Leasing Corp. v. Thomason, 96
Idaho 574, 578, 532 P.2d 916, 919-20 (1974) (lessor of farm equipment had a duty to
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second, to refrain from taking action to increase damages (to avoid
make commercially reasonable efforts to re-lease the equipment during the balance of
the term of the lease); Theis v. du Pont, Glore Forgan Inc., 212 Kan. 301, 308, 510
P.2d 1212, 1217-18 (1973) (customer suing broker for unauthorized transactions on cus-
tomer's account was not required to go into the market in an attempt to minimize dam-
ages); Whitley County Bd. of Educ. v. Meadors, 444 S.W.2d 890, 891-92 (Ky. 1969)
(wrongfully discharged school teacher did not have to seek other employment in the cir-
cumstances); Volos, Ltd. v. Sotera, 264 Md. 155, 176-77, 286 A.2d 101, 111-12 (1972)
(discharged employee used reasonable efforts to obtain other employment and thus sat-
isfied the mitigation requirement); Frank v. Jansen, - Minn. -, -, 226 N.W.2d 739,
740 (1975) (expenses incurred in mitigation may be added to damages awarded on
breach of contract for sale of house); Stevens v. School Bd., 296 Minn. 413, 415-16,
208 N.W.2d 866, 868 (1973) (wrongfully discharged school teacher must mitigate dam-
ages by seeking other employment; job so obtained does not constitute waiver of the
teacher's claim); Wolf v. Missouri State Training School for Boys, 517 S.W.2d 138, 142-
44 (Mo. 1974) (wrongfully discharged employee's recovery reduced by amount the em-
ployee reasonably could have earned during the period of discharge); Business Fin. Co.
v. Red Barn, Inc., 163 Mont. 263, 267-68, 517 P.2d 383, 386 (1973) (during 17 months
of breach, lessor acted reasonably by giving frequent default notices to lessee, need not
have repossessed business machines); Little v. Rose, 285 N.C. 724, 729-30, 208 S.E.2d
666, 669-70 (1974) (buyer's reasonable reliance on seller's assurances relieves buyer of
obligation to repair machinery); Tomlinson Lumber Yard v. Engle, 216 N.W.2d 87, 89-
90 (N.D. 1974) (owner, by preventing contractor from completing bar, failed to miti-
gate damages); Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 256 Ore. 539, 542-43, 474 P.2d 529, 530-
31 (1970) (grower acted reasonably in relying on labor contractor's assurances, refusing
contractor's modified offer; grower relieved of duty to take action to mitigate); Ivester
v. Family Pools, Inc., Bosco Indus., 262 S.C. 67, 202 S.E.2d 362 (1974) (owner of a
swimming pool left incomplete by the contractor not required to mitigate damages by
completing pool); Ferrell v. Elrod, 63 Tenn. App. 129, 157, 469 S.W.2d 678, 689 (1971)
(lessee, seeking lost profits resulting from breach of the lease, required to minimize dam-
ages by making reasonable efforts to find substitute premises); Houston Chronicle Pub.
Co. v. McNair Trucklease, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 924, 929-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (breach of truck purchase contract; recovery of investment and lost profits after
mitigation); Salt Bowl Co. v. State, - Utah -, -, 535 P.2d 1253, 1256 (1975) (plain-
tiffs five-year lease of the state fairgrounds for automobile racing was terminated on
the stated ground that the racing violated Salt Lake City's noise ordinance. Plaintiff's
refusal to accept the state's invitation to test the noise ordinance by running cars on
the track was established as the point in time at which plaintiff's damages were cut off,
its refusal being deemed in violation of its obligation to "exert reasonable and prudent
efforts to mitigate its damages"); Sheldon v. Northeast Developers, Inc., 127 Vt. 15, 18,
238 A.2d 775, 776-77 (1968) (offer by contractor to make repairs relieves homeowner
from duty to act to mitigate damages by making repairs "for at least as long as the plain-
tiff was reasonably entitled to expect the defendant might act"); Valiga v. National
Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 244, 206 N.W.2d 377, 384 (1973) (UCC case involving
breach of warranty in sale of mink food; the food inhibited the minks' breeding ability.
Buyers decided to sell the "breeder" minks for their pelts and the vendor challenged their
action. The court said: "The test should not be whether the actions of the plaintiffs,
in attempting to mitigate their damages, were right or wrong, but rather whether they
were reasonable").
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harm).1' To the extent the mitigation doctrine reduces damages, it
also reduces pressure to perform.
A. Avoidable Harms
Problem 12. Failing to Stop Building. Alice, a contractor, and Bob,
the owner of a lot, entered a contract under which Alice was to build
a house on Bob's lot for $40,000, payable on completion. When Alice
had spent $11,000 on the job, Bob ordered her to remove her crews
and to cease work. Alice refused to stop and completed the house at
a total cost to her of $33,000-the $11,000 already spent plus $22,000
spent after Bob directed her to stop.
By going forward after being told to stop, Alice breached her duty
to refrain from taking action to increase damages. Had Alice stopped as
directed, an $18,000 award would have left her with her expectancy-
a $7,000 profit plus the $11,000 she had spent."1 9 By completing the
house at a total cost of $33,000, Alice raised to $40,000 the award
necessary to leave her with a $7,000 profit. If Bob were required to
pay $40,000, Alice would still have a $7,000 profit, but Bob would have
to pay $40,000 rather than $18,000 to permit Alice to achieve that posi-
tion. Thus, Alice's act in completing the house would gain her nothing
but would cost Bob a substantial amount. The avoidable-harms ele-
ment of the mitigation doctrine would limit Alice's recovery to
$18,000 because Alice breached her duty to refrain from taking affir-
mative action to increase Bob's damages. In getting the completed
house for $18,000, Bob would receive a substantial windfall, albeit one
he might not want. Alice, instead of having a $7,000 profit, would
118. See Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 1929)
(contractor, notified that county was cancelling contract to build a bridge, could not pro-
ceed to build the bridge and recover the contract price); Eazor Express, Inc. v. Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters, 376 F. Supp. 841, 849 (W.D. Pa. 1974), modified by increas-
ing damages awarded, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975) (suit against union for failure to
use all reasonable efforts to terminate a wildcat strike, employer's damages were limited
because of its failure to act reasonably to bring the strike to an end); Clark v. Marsiglia,
I Denio 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670 (N.Y. 1845) (aggrieved party's failure to obey order
to stop work, which order was a breach of contract, held not to increase damages pay-
able by the party who breached, the damages awarded being the amount the aggrieved
party would have recovered had the order to stop been obeyed); Tower Contracting Co.
v. Flores, 294 S.W.2d 266, 273-74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), rev'd on other grounds, 157
Tex. 297, 302 S.W.2d 396 (1957) (contractor prevented from recovering the contract
price when it continued to perform after being informed that the contract was can-
celled; supreme court approved lower court's holding on the avoidable-harms issue).
119. See note 118 supra.
Washington University Open Scholarship
214 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:179
lose $15,000-a $22,000 swing. By going forward in the face of Bob's
directive to stop, Alice, the party initially aggrieved by Bob's repudia-
tion, would occupy a far worse position than she would have achieved
had both parties performed their contractual obligations; and Bob, who
breached, would be in a far better position.
Both parties breached duties-Bob, his contract duty, and Alice, her
duty to avoid increasing Bob's damages. In balancing the equities, the
system apparently deems Alice's breach of duty as more serious than
Bob's; Bob is treated as more aggrieved than Alice. The system, sup-
posedly nonpenal, 120 imposes a severe penalty on Alice for building
the house as she promised.' 21
In support of the avoidable-harms portion of the mitigation doctrine,
it may be argued that the law should not permit useless acts; that Alice's
act in completing the house after repudiation is useless in that it
increases Bob's total damage payment without any gain to Alice; that
any such result is inconsistent with the compensatory nature of contract
120. See Davis Cattle Co. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 393 F. Supp. 1165, 1196 (D.
Colo. 1975) (no exemplary damages for bad-faith or gross-mistake breach of contract).
See also Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 53-54, 338 A.2d 43, 45 (1975)
(when "the tort is one arising out of a contractual relationship ... punitive damages
are recoverable only upon a showing of actual malice"); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Keys, 317 So. 2d 396, 398 (Miss. 1975) ("[plunitive damages are not recoverable for
the breach of a contract unless such breach is attended by intentional wrong, insult, abuse
or such gross negligence as to consist of an independent tort"); Bank of New Mexico
v. Rice, 78 N.M. 170, 429 P.2d 368 (1967) (bank which breached a contract to advance
funds held liable for punitive damages on a finding that the bank had acted with malice).
121. The avoidable harms and mitigation doctrine-or, perhaps, doctrines-are re-
ferred to in the present article as imposing a "duty" on and as "penalizing" the aggrieved
party. The failure to take reasonable action to decrease damages and the taking of
affirmative action which increases damages are thought to violate the "right" of the
party who breached to pay the minimum amount of damages caused by the breach.
And to the extent that the aggrieved party receives a smaller amount of damages than
otherwise, the aggrieved party is being penalized for failing to take reasonable action to
mitigate or for taking affirmative action which increases the amount of damage suf-
fered. The use of the terms "duty" to mitigate and "penalty" for failure to mitigate
is rejected by several commentators and cases. See, e.g., McClelland v. Climax Hosiery
Mills, 252 N.Y. 347, 169 N.E. 605, modified, 253 N.Y. 534, 171 N.E. 770 (1930):
What is meant by the supposed duty is merely this: That if he unreasonably
reject [other employment] he will not be heard to say that the loss of wages
from then on shall be deemed the jural consequence of the earlier discharge.
He has broken the chain of causation, and loss resulting to him thereafter is
suffered through his own act.
Id. at 359, 169 N.E. at 609 (Cardozo, J.). See also Coury Bros. Ranches, Inc. v. Ells-
worth, 103 Ariz. 515, 518, 446 P.2d 458, 461 (1968); Theis v. du Pont, Glore Forgan,
Inc., 212 Kan. 301, 307, 510 P.2d 1212, 1217 (1973); RySTATEMENT oF CONTRACTS §
336, Comment d (1932); 5 A. CoRzeN, CoREiN ON CoNTRACTS § 1039 (1951); 11 S.
WrLLIsTON, A TAnsE ON TIM LAW OF CoNRCrs § 1353 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968).
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damages and penalizes Bob to no purpose. 122  The doctrine is also
consistent with Holmes' notion that either party to a contract has the
right as well as the power to breach and to substitute money damages
for performance.' 23 Breach may be "honorable" if the party who
breaches does so because funds will not be available to pay the full
contract debt. In economic terms, if Bob determines that the money
committed to the contract project has other more valuable uses, logic
dictates that he repudiate and pay a relatively small amount for the
privilege of using the funds more profitably. Finally, as noted in the
discussion of Problem 7, if Bob can obtain the services of another con-
tractor to complete the house for less than $22,000, requiring Alice to
stop does her no economic harm, while employing another contractor
to complete the house makes economic sense from Bob's perspective.
Accepting all arguments in favor of an $18,000 award to Alice in
Problem 12, the fact remains that Bob, although he repudiated the con-
tract, now has a house that cost $33,000 to build, for which he paid
only $18,000. If the house has a market value of $40,000, and Bob
sells the house at market, it would be reasonable to require Bob to re-
turn some of that money to Alice. 124 If he is required to pay her
$15,000 in addition to the $18,000 damage award, Alice will be left
with no out-of-pocket loss and Bob will retain a $7,000 windfall-the
profit Alice would have made but for Bob's breach and her own breach
of her duty to avoid increasing damages. If such an adjustment is
made, the system, by denying profit to Alice, would pressure her to
stop as directed, but would limit the sanction imposed on Alice to her
loss of profits. Such a result is consistent with the usual result when
a person who made a favorable contract breaches that contract.
122, A man may hire another to labor for a year, and within the year his situa-
tion may be such as to render the work entirely useless to him. The party
employed cannot persist in working, though he is entitled to the damages con-
sequent upon his disappointment. So if one hires another to build a house,
and subsequent events put it out of his power to pay for it, it is commendable
in him to stop the work, and pay for what has been done and the damages
sustained by the contractor.
Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317, 319, 43 Am. Dec. 670, 671 (N.Y. 1845).
123. The only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the
law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to
pass. In every case it leaves him free from interference until the time for ful-
fillment has gone by, and therefore free to break his contract if he chooses.
0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 236 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
124. In Tower Contracting Co. v. Flores, 294 S.W.2d 266, 273 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956), rev'd on other grounds, 157 Tex. 297, 302 S.W.2d 296 (1957), a contractor who
proceeded with a construction project after having been directed by the owner to stop
would have been permitted to recover on a quantum meruit theory for the value of the
service actually rendered had such a count been included in the contractor's pleading.
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Problem 13. The Special Chair. Alice employed 20 persons in a
small shop which hand-crafted furniture. She entered a written contract
with Bob to build a wooden chair for him for $900. Had the chair been
completed, Alice's profit would have been $300. (Her material, labor
and overhead costs would have totalled $600). When Alice's material,
labor and overhead costs on the chair came to $200, Bob repudiated and
directed that all work on the chair stop. At the time of breach, the
partially completed chair had a market value-scrap or salvage-of $25.
Had the chair been completed, it would have had a market value of
$800.
While the facts of Problem 13 probably would bring the case within
the Uniform Commercial Code,'25 the result under the Code and at
common law would be similar. If Alice stopped work on the chair
as directed, it would have taken $475 to provide her with her expect-
ancy, a $300 profit.12 6 Alice spent $200 and had a partially completed
chair with scrap or salvage value of $25' 7--a net out-of-pocket expense
of $175. A $475 award would reimburse Alice for these expenses and
leave her with her $300 expectancy profit. (The same result is
reached by applying the formula: $900 contract price minus $400 cost
to complete minus $25 expenses saved.)
If Alice disregarded Bob's direction to stop work and completed the
chair, her expectancy would be achieved by an award of $100.
By definition, Alice could have sold the chair for the market price,
$800.128 With a contract price of $900, a total cost (materials,
125. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-102 ("this Article [Sales] applies to
transactions in goods . . ."), 2-105(1) ("'[g]oods' mean all things (including spe-
cially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the con-
tract for sale. . ."). See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 1974).
126. It is difficult to know which section of the Uniform Commercial Code would
apply to the facts of Problem 13. If the specially made chair has no ascertainable mar-
ket price, § 2-708(2) probably would apply, and Alice would recover $475. Section 2-
708(2) applies only if the contract-price-market-price formula of § 2-708(1) "is
inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as performance would have done
.... " In the absence of a reliable market price figure, § 2-708(1) would not put Alice
in as good a position as performance. Under § 2-708(2), Alice would recover the profit
she would have made from full performance plus the costs she had reasonably incurred
minus the amount received for the scrap value of the chair. See Detroit Power Screw-
driver Co. v. Ladney, 25 Mich. App. 478, 181 N.W.2d 828 (1970).
127. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-704(2).
128. See J.M. Huber Corp. v. Denman, 367 F.2d 104, 109 (5th Cir. 1966) (in de-
termining market price, "the law looks [to] . . . the supposed free seller . .. [and] free
buyer dealing freely at arm's length supposedly in relation to property which neither will
ever own, buy or sell"). The Minnesota supreme court discussed market value in Leh-
man v. Hansord Pontiac Co., 246 Minn. 1, 74 N.W.2d 305 (1955):
It is established in the law generally that the market value of a thing is what
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labor and overhead) of $600 and a market price of $800, a $100 award
would have given Alice her $300 expectancy profit.
The damages would have been increased by $375 had Alice followed
Bob's instructions to stop work on the chair. Going forward would not
be a useless act. In such circumstances, both the common law and the
Uniform Commercial Code would allow the injured party to ignore the
stop order and complete performance if the decision to do so were
based on a reasonable judgment that going forward would probably de-
crease the damages arising from the breach.12 If the decision to go
forward were a commercially reasonable judgment, the risk of in-
creased damages would fall on the party who breached. 130 Thus, if
Alice reasonably decided that completing the chair would reduce dam-
ages, and she sustained greater damages due to a falling market or un-
it will bring in the open market, the price which the owner, if willing but not
compelled to sell, could obtain from a buyer, willing but not compelled to buy.
It has also been defined as a price established by public sales in the way of
ordinary business ....
Id. at 8, 74 N.W.2d at 310. See also UNIFOR COMIERCIAL CODE §§ 2-723, 2-724.
129. See Buchman v. Millville Mfg. Co., 17 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1927); Lan-
non Mfg. Co. v. Strauss Co., 235 Iowa 97, 102-06, 15 N.W.2d 899, 902-04 (1944); J.
Marshall Robbins Enterprises v. Ewald Steel Co., 52 Mich. App. 599, 602-03, 218 N.W.
2d 125, 127-28 (1974) (plaintiff completed and raced car despite withdrawal of one of
its sponsors, contract with other sponsors meant that obligation to mitigate did not re-
quire plaintiff to withdraw car from scheduled races or to leave it incomplete); Dowling
v. Whites Lumber & Supply Co., 170 Miss. 267, 154 So. 703 (1934):
[lit is the settled general rule that, when the owner notifies a building con-
tractor that the owner repudiates or renounces the contract and explicitly di-
rects the contractor not to do anything further under it, the contractor cannot
go on and complete the work and sue for the full contract price. . . . Two
reasons are given as furnishing the grounds for the rule. One is that the con-
tractor is interested only in the profit which he will make out of the contract,
and, if he be given his profit in damages, heis made whole. The other is in
the general principle that a person whose contract has been breached must so
conduct himself as not to enhance or increase the loss or damage to the oppo-
site party . . . . But the rule runs only so far as run the reasons which give
it existence. When the work has already been entered upon and has progressed
to the extent that to stop will leave a situation wherein it will be impracticable
to attempt a dependable estimate of the contractor's damages to the owner, or
at least will not enhance his damages, the contractor may go forward and com-
plete the work.
Id. at 273-74, 154 So. at 705. UCC § 2-704(2) contemplates going forward with per-
formance "in the exercise of a reasonable commercial judgment,"
130. See Hildreth v. Bergeron, 110 N.H. 197, 199, 263 A.2d 664, 667 (1970) ("risks
incident to reasonable efforts to mitigate damages are borne by the party breaking the
contract whether the effort was successful or not"); Valiga v. National Food Co., 58
Wis. 2d 232, 244, 206 N.W.2d 377, 384 (1973) ("[tlhe test should not be whether the
actions of the plaintiffs, in attempting to mitigate their damages, were right or wrong,
but rather whether they were reasonable").
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expectedly higher costs, she probably could hold Bob liable for the
larger amount.
Problem 13 points up an apparent tension between the requirement
that the aggrieved party do nothing to increase damages and the
requirement that such party do everything reasonable to decrease them.
Since commercially reasonable action or inaction is all that is required
of the aggrieved party, the apparent tension dissolves so long as the
decision made-to stop as directed or to go forward-meets the reason-
ableness test. The action or inaction need not be right, merely reason-
able.
B. Mitigation
Problem 14. The Employee. On August 1, 1974, Alice and Bob
entered a contract under which Bob was to work in Alice's steel fabri-
cating plant as head of the trimming department for the 1974-75
trimming season, from September 1, 1974, through February 28, 1975,
at a salary of $3,500 a month for the six-month season. Bob was to
work from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday of each
week.
A week before he was to start work, Bob received a letter from Alice
stating in part:
"We have decided to employ Chadd as head of the trimming de-
partment for the coming season and will not need your services."
Bob immediately consulted a lawyer who prepared a letter to Alice, over
Bob's signature, stating in part:
"You have breached the contract we had and I will hold you
responsible for full damages resulting from your breach."
Alice received Bob's letter two days before the season was to start and
immediately responded as follows:
"Received yours of August 30 and certainly apologize. I have
gotten myself into a mess. We must use Chadd as head of trim-
ming, but I am willing to have you work for us during the season,
either as Chadd's assistant or in some other capacity. Best regards
to your wonderful mother."
Bob did not respond to Alice's letter.
During September and October, Bob diligently looked for work as
head of the trimming department in a steel fabricating plant. He
refused two job offers to head such trimming departments at $3,000 a
month, saying that he had worked hard over the years to achieve his
status as a $3,500 trimming-department head and that he was not going
to move back to being a $3,000 department head. He also rejected
an offer of $3,750 a month as an assistant to the head of the trimming
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department in a third plant. Bob also was offered a job as head of the
trimming department in a plant located 450 miles away from his home.
Bob rejected the offer, although the salary was $4,000 a month, because
his mother was ill and he wanted to be near her.
Finally, after two months of looking, Bob made the reasonable deci-
sion that with the season one-third gone, he was unlikely to obtain work
as head trimmer in the fabricated steel industry. He took a job as
executive trainee in a large department store chain at a salary of $1,500
a month, a position requiring Bob to work from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Monday through Friday of each week. A day or two later, Bob, who
had an excellent voice, was offered a job as a singer in a local night
club. He accepted the job and sang four nights a week, giving
one show at 9:00 p.m. and another at 11:00 p.m. Bob held both jobs
from November 1, 1974 through February 28, 1975. For that period,
he earned $6,500 per month, or a total of $26,000-$6,000 attributable
to his job as a trainee and $20,000 to his job as a singer. Had Alice
not breached, Bob would have made $21,000 working for her over the
six-month contract term.
Bob would probably recover $15,000 from Alice although he earned
$26,000 over the last four months of the contract term-$5,000 more
than he would have earned working for Alice for six months-and he
rejected several opportunities to work in the steel fabricating industry
at salaries up to and above that promised by Alice. The only earnings
likely to mitigate damages would be the $6,000 Bob earned as a trainee
during the last four months of the contract period.131
Were Bob viewed solely as an economic unit, the mitigation obliga-
tion imposed on Bob might operate as a mechanism to establish the
market value of the services Alice agreed to buy. Thus, had Bob ob-
tained employment in another steel fabricating plant as head of the
trimming department at a salary of $3,500 a month for the six-month
period, the contract-price ($3,500 per month) minus market-price
($3,500 per month) formula used in sale-of-goods cases would have
yielded only nominal damages because Bob had sold his services to
131. See Smith v. Beloit Corp., 40 Wis. 2d 550, 559, 162 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1968)
(higher compensation at new job has no impact on wrongfully discharged employee's
recovery of salary during period of unemployment following discharge). The result in
Smith may be inconsistent with the expectancy goal of putting the aggrieved party in as
good a position as if there had been no breach. Viewed from the employee's position
immediately after the original contract had run, the employee who recovers the contract
rate for the time of unemployment and retains the above-contract-rate wage for the
balance of the period will be in a better position than if the employer had performed
the contract. Only if the original contract is viewed as a series of separate weeks,
months, or years, with the full salary accruing during each time period independently
of other time periods, can the result in ,Smith be explained,
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Alice at the market price. The contract was in balance; Alice could
breach without loss.132  If the best price Bob could obtain for his ser-
vices elsewhere was $2,500 per month, the contract price would have
been above the market price and Bob would be entitled to the $1,000
monthly difference, just as a seller of goods would receive the benefit
of a bargain to sell above market. Alice, having made an unfavorable
contract, would be required to pay for her error in judgment.
The mitigation rules of the expectancy-damage system treat
employees not only as economic units but as persons with feelings and
obligations unrelated to the economics of the specific contract. Ag-
grieved employees need not humiliate themselves, 133 take positions of
lesser status than the contract gave them,184 or take positions in distant
localities if it is personally inconvenient to do so.135  In Problem 14,
it is unlikely that Bob would be required to accept a job other than
as head of trimming, or something of equal status,3 6 to accept a lesser
132. See Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 358 F. Supp. 430
(M.D. Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 983 (1975) (after finding that a college professor had
been dismissed without a hearing, nominal damages awarded in view of the employee's
failure to prove actual damages).
133. See, e.g., University of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Alas. 1974)
(a wrongfully discharged employee must accept alternative employment "if it did not in-
volve embarrassment or hardship, in order to mitigate"), citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF AGENCY § 455, Comment d (1958) (employee need not accept alternative employ-
ment if such acceptance would involve "humiliation or degradation").
134. See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 182-84, 474
P.2d 689, 692-94, 89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740-42 (1970); Southern Keswick, Inc. v. Whether-
holt, 293 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974); Hussey v. Holloway, 217 Mass. 100, 105,
104 N.E. 471, 472-73 (1914); Michigan Emp. Rel. Comm'n v. Kleen-O-Rama, 60 Mich.
App. 61, 64-65, 230 N.W.2d 308, 310 (1975); Streett v. Laclede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d
691, 699-701 (Mo. 1966); Kotan v. School District No. 110C, 13 Ore. App. 139, 148-
49, 509 P.2d 452, 457 (1973); State ex rel. Schilling v. Baird, 65 Wis. 2d 394, 398-
400, 222 N.W.2d 666, 668-69 (1974). See also Ballard v. El Dorado Tire Co., 512 F.2d
901, 905 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the employer argued that in light of the noncompeti-
tion clause in the employment contract, the employee's duty to mitigate required that
he seek any employment and not merely similar employment. In rejecting the em-
ployer's argument, the court said that the noncompetition clause merely set up a negative
duty not to compete and placed no affirmative duty on the employee to seek dissimilar
employment.
135. See Punkar v. King Plastic Corp., 290 So. 2d 505, 507-08 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974)
("[a] wrongfully discharged employee is not necessarily obligated to mitigate damages
by accepting alternative employment at a distance from his home"); Hussey v. Hollo-
way, 217 Mass. 100, 105, 104 N.E. 471, 472-73 (1914); State ex rel. Schilling v. Baird,
65 Wis. 2d 394, 398, 222 N.W.2d 666, 669 (1974).
136. See note 134 supra. See also Schiller v. Keuffel & Esser Co., 21 Wis. 2d 545,
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salary for doing the same work, 1a7 or to move to another city and leave
his mother.138 He is required to act reasonably to mitigate; but reason-
ableness in the context of an employment contract is not limited to eco-
nomic reasonableness. In recognizing status consciousness as a factor
in determining whether Bob acted reasonably, the system recognizes
to some extent human irrationality and psychological needs.
Although Bob probably was not obligated to accept the position as
a trainee, he did so and the $6,000 he earned would be applied
to mitigate damages. 139 Since Bob could not find employment
as head of a trimming operation in the steel fabricating industry, the
market value of his services in this specialized capacity was zero.
Under a strict contract-price-market-price analysis, money earned in
another capacity might be irrelevant in ascertaining damages. He con-
tracted to sell his services for $3,500 a month when the market price
for such services was zero. Just as in Problem 13, however, when the
$25 salvage value of the partially completed chair was deducted from
the aggrieved party's recovery, the "salvage or scrap" value of Bob's
services should be deducted, at least to the extent Bob realized that
value. Although Bob had no obligation to sell his services in
an inferior position, the income obtained when he chose to do so would
go in mitigation.
The money earned as a trainee is distinguishable from Bob's income
as a singer. Bob sold Alice his time from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Mon-
day through Friday of each week, for a six-month period. Bob could
not have worked as a trainee during these hours had Alice not
breached. Alice's breach, however, was not a prerequisite to Bob be-
ing able to accept a position as a singer. He could have fulfilled his
obligations to Alice under the employment contract while still singing
553, 124 N.W.2d 646, 651 (1963), in which the court said that a wrongfully discharged
employee need not look for nor accept employment of a "different or inferior kind in
order to minimize damages."
137. See Streett v. Laclede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d 691, 701 (Mo. 1966).
138. See note 135 supra.
139. See Southern Keswick, Inc. v. Whetherholt, 293 So. 2d 109 (Fla. Ct. App.
1974) (reversible error to charge the jury that damages were not to be reduced by
wrongfully discharged employee's subsequent employment of a different or inferior na-
ture; while the employee need not seek inferior or different employment, if such employ-
ment is obtained the earnings go in mitigation). See also Sheppard v. Southern Ry.,
258 F, Supp. 217, 223 (E.D.N.C. 1966), afrd sub nom. Edwards v. Southern Ry., 376
F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1967) (employee's earnings at a lesser position went in mitigation
of damages); Carroll v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 31 Cal. App. 3d 562, 566-67, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 557, 558-59 (1973) ($29.40 earned by a wrongfully discharged civil service em-
ployee while spending 147 days in jail mitigated the damages owed by the employer).
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in a night club four evenings a week, unless his contract with Alice
prohibited such work. Since Alice's breach did not make the singing
income possible, the original contract and the singing were completely
unrelated and the income Bob earned singing would not go in mitiga-
tion. 40  Bob always had the ability to do both jobs. Had Bob
accepted a job on a shift running from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.,
Monday through Friday, the earnings-or most of them-would have
gone in mitigation even though the hours did not overlap. 141  Be-
cause Bob could not have worked a 12-hour shift for another employer
while carrying out his 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. obligation to Alice,
her breach would have made it possible for Bob to take the second
job.
In the context of the expectancy damage system, employers who
breach employment contracts and buyers who breach sales contracts are
treated similarly. In both cases, damage awards are based on
the difference between the contract price and the market price. In
employment contracts, damage awards are established only after taking
140. See Redman v. Department of Educ., 519 P.2d 760, 771 (Alas. 1974) (only the
income from a position discharged teacher could not have held had she been teaching
would go in mitigation); Albert Johann & Sons Co. v. Echols, 143 Ind. App. 122, 130,
238 N.E.2d 685, 689 (1968) ("[t]he question . . . is . .. what income was received
as a result of being relieved from performance of the litigated contract"); Polk v. Tor-
rence, 218 Tenn. 680, 405 S.W.2d 575 (1966) (after dismissal, plaintiff increased his
hours on a second job by working Saturdays and Sundays; increase in pay did not go
in mitigation because it could have been earned without regard to the original job). See
also Lee v. Ralston School Dist., 180 Neb. 784, 145 N.W.2d 919 (1966) (discharged
teacher could not have worked for the Navy while performing his school duties, thus,
income from new job as Navy recruiter was deducted from damages). In Currieri v.
City of Roseville, 50 Cal. App. 3d 499, 123 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1975), a wrongfully-
discharged policeman, rather than seeking other employment, enrolled as a full-time stu-
dent and was found by the trial court to have formed an intention to pursue a scholastic
career. In response to the employee's argument that he had no duty to seek other em-
ployment and that the mitigation rule merely provided for "a deduction of the amount
he might have earned had he continued to seek employment," the court on appeal quoted
from the trial court's finding "that had this plaintiff been reinstated. . . he would have
resigned to continue school." Id. at 506-07, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 318-19. In view of the
employee's intention to remain a student, the court denied recovery of wages for the pe-
riod following the formation of the fixed intention to become a student.
141. See note 140 supra. In State ex rel. Klingler v. Baird, 56 Wis. 2d 460, 468-
69, 202 N.W.2d 31, 36 (1972), the court said:
In determining the difference between full back pay and earnings from other
employment, two factors should be given mutual consideration. First, whether
such earnings accrued during what would have been his regularly assigned
hours of duty, and second, the amount of his earnings, if any, which he was
receiving outside his regularly assigned hours of duty, immediately preceding
his suspension.
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into account the personal needs of the employee, but the effort remains
one to establish the market price1 42 of the services. In sales contracts,
however, market price is established without regard to the seller's per-
sonal problems unless these problems are known to the buyer at the
time the contract is made. One possible reason for the different treat-
ment is that the foreseeability test controls in both instances. Employ-
ers know at the time of contracting that employees may have personal
problems which will affect their ability to mitigate damages caused by
a breach. Such problems are normal to employment contracts. Per-
sonal problems normally do not dominate contracts to sell goods. Only
when special circumstances are known to the seller at the time of con-
tracting is the seller liable for anything but pure contract-price-market-
price damages.14 3 If special circumstances are present, damages over
and above market price damages may be awarded, 144 but a condition
precedent to such special damages is proof that the buyer has taken
reasonable steps to mitigate. 14 5
Problem 15. The Layabout. Same fact pattern as in Problem 14:
repudiation by Alice, the employer, of a contract for a six-month season
running from September 1, 1974 through February 28, 1975; $3,500
monthly salary as head of the trimming department; repudiation shortly
before September 1, 1974; except that Bob, the employee, failed to seek
other employment and none was offered. On March 15, 1975, Bob filed
suit for breach of contract. At trial, the evidence was clear that had
Bob sought employment in a capacity similar to that of head of the trim-
ming department, he would have been unsuccessful. Would Bob be able
to recover $3,500 per month for the full six-month period?
142. One may view the mitigation doctrine in employment cases as a mechanism to
establish the market price for the services the employee contracts to sell. If no other
similar position is available to the employee, the market price for that kind of service
is zero and a damage award of the contract price is the same as a contract-price-minus-
market price award. If mitigation is solely a mechanism for establishing the market
price for the kind of service sold, it seems to be error to deduct money earned in an
inferior position when no comparable position can be found. Whatever is earned in the
inferior position, the market price of the comparable position remains zero. Courts do
not discuss mitigation in employment cases as a mechanism for establishing market
price, however, and if the overall expectancy goal of putting the injured party in as good
a position governs, money earned in inferior positions should go in mitigation.
143. See UNFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-715(2); see also KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual
Electronics Corp., 465 F.2d 1382, 1388 (8th Cir. 1972) (lessee of TV equipment per-
sisted in using defective equipment beyond a reasonable period of time); Valiga v. Na-
tional Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 244-45, 206 N.W.2d 377, 384 (1973) ("[tlhe test
should not be whether the actions of the plaintiffs, in attempting to mitigate their dam-
ages, were right or wrong, but rather whether they were reasonable").
144. See note 143 supra.
145. Id.
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Despite the fact that the mitigation rule in its usual form requires
that the aggrieved party use reasonable efforts to reduce damages,1 40
Bob, who made no effort to mitigate, nevertheless would recover the
full $21,000 contract price. Whether or not he acted reasonably in fail-
ing to look for other employment, no similar employment was available.
Had he used reasonable efforts, he would have failed. The evidence
therefore established that the market value of Bob's service as head of
the trimming department was zero. Consequently, Alice would have no
legitimate complaint about Bob's inaction. It might be said that Bob
acted reasonably although he did not realize it at the time. Whether
his actions were reasonable or not, the lack of availability of compar-
able employment would be the controlling factor and Bob could re-
cover. Thus, a caveat must be added to the rule that the aggrieved
party must make all reasonable efforts to reduce the damages: He ei-
ther must make such efforts, or prove that such efforts, if made, would
have failed.147
Problem 16. The Entrepreneur. Alice, a plumbing contractor em-
ploying 50 plumbers, entered a contract with Bob, a general contrac-
tor, to do the plumbing work on a large building Bob was constructing.
146. See CJ. Langenfelder & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 384 F.2d 1005, 1006-07 (Ct.
Cl. 1967) (no duty to take impractical and uneconomic steps to turn unsuitable soil into
useful material); Sackett v. Spindler, 248 Cal. App. 2d 220, 238-39, 56 Cal. Rptr. 435,
447 (1967) (no duty to seek new purchasers after buyer's default; almost impossible to
sell newspaper after publicized sale to defendant had fallen through); Steele v. J.T. Case
Co., 197 Kan. 554, 564-65, 419 P.2d 902, 911 (1966) (buyer not barred from recovering
his damages, if, relying on the seller's promises, he fails to take steps to lessen his loss);
Whitley County Bd. of Educ. v. Meadors, 444 S.W.2d 890, 891-92 (Ky. 1969) (dis-
charged teacher relying on superintendent's assurance she would be reemployed); Streett
v. Laclede-Christy Co., 409 S.W.2d 691, 701 (Mo. 1966) ("[tlhe question is whether
plaintiff had used reasonable diligence and had done the best that he could under preva.
lent mercantile conditions and opportunities"); Little v. Rose, 285 N.C. 724, 728, 208
S.E.2d 666, 669 (1974) (duty to mitigate is "established principle," unmitigated damages
considered too remote for recovery); Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 256 Ore. 539, 542,
474 P.2d 529, 530 (1970) ("party injured by a breach of contract is required to do what
reasonable care and business prudence would dictate in order to minimize his loss");
Ivester v. Family Pools, Inc., Bosco Indus., 262 S.C. 67, 70, 202 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1974)
(buyer not required to make arrangement to have pool completed by another contractor;
the seller will not "be heard to say that the plaintiff [buyer] might have performed for
him"); Birge v. Toppers Menswear, Inc., 473 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (in landlord's breach of covenant to repair, tenant owes a duty to move its
business to another location).
147. See Zuider Zee Oyster Bar, Inc. v. Martin, 503 S.W.2d 292, 297 (Tex. Civ. App.
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (allegation that wrongfully discharged employee purposely re-
frained from seeking employment). See also School Employee Ass'n v. Personnel
Comm'n, 30 Cal. App. 3d 241, 249-50, 106 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288-89 (1973).
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The contract called for a payment of $120,000 for the plumbing work
and Alice calculated that her cost would be $100,000. When the
plumbing work was 75% completed, Alice having spent $75,000 on the
job, Bob had an argument with Clara, president of the corporation that
employed him. As a result, Bob withdrew his work crews and directed
Alice to do the same. Alice did as she was directed. Within a few
days, Bob repudiated his contract with the corporation.
On behalf of the corporation, Clara asked Alice if she would complete
the plumbing work on the building, the same work Alice was to do under
her contract with Bob. Alice agreed to complete the job for $40,000.
Clara agreed to this price and Alice finished the work, spending $25,000
and receiving $40,000 from the corporation.
In a suit for breach of contract against Bob, would the $15,000 profit
Alice made on the second contract mitigate the $95,000 damage award
to which Alice would otherwise be entitled?
Alice probably would recover $95,000 from Bob; the $15,000 profit
on the second contract for the same work would not go in mitigation.148
With a $95,000 recovery, Alice would make a $20,000 profit on her
contract with Bob. Since Alice also retained the $15,000 profit she
made in her contract with the corporation, her position would be better
than if Bob had not repudiated. Nonetheless, the mitigation doctrine
would not set off the profits on the second contract against the amount
Bob owed.
Alice, the plumbing contractor, is in a different position than Bob,
the employee in Problem 14. In theory and in fact, Alice, who per-
forms her contracts by means of employees, can contract for and per-
form more than one job in the same period of time.149  By using crews
of employees, Alice can do several jobs simultaneously in several dif-
ferent locations. The employee cannot. Only the employer's breach
in Problem 14 allowed Bob to take on a traineeship. Just as the
employer's breach in Problem 14 did not make it possible for Bob to ac-
cept employment as a night-club singer, so Bob's breach of the plumb-
ing contract is unrelated to Alice's ability to take on other work. Since
148, See Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Constr. Co., 177 Mass. 41, 58 N.E. 478 (1900). See
also Grinnell Co. v. Voorhees, 1 F.2d 693, 694-95 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 629
(1924); Willred Co. v. Westmoreland Metal Mfg. Co., 200 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (E.D.
Pa. 1961); Katz v. Exclusive Auto Leasing, Inc., 282 A.2d 866, 868 (Del. Super. Ct.
1971); M. & R. Contractors & Builders, Inc. v. Michael, 215 Md. 340, 354-55, 138 A.2d
350, 358 (1958).
149. See Patterson, Builder's Measure of Recovery for Breach of Contract, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 1286, 1306-07 (1931).
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Bob's breach does not create in Alice the power to assume other con-
tractual duties, Alice's activities on other jobs are unrelated to Bob's
breach, and profits on other jobs do not go in mitigation.
In Problem 16, however, the contract Alice made with Clara could
not have been made except for the fact that Bob breached. Does this
fact convert Alice, the plumbing contractor, into a factual counterpart
of Bob, the employee who accepted a trainee's job from 9:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m., or does her second contract remain independent of the
breach of the first?
On facts similar to those in Problem 16, courts have denied Bob the
right to have the profits on the second contract applied to mitigate the
damages he must pay. 50 There are at least two arguments in support
of this denial. First, since a contractor has a general capacity to assume
additional jobs, it is unimportant that the particular job taken is avail-
able only because of the breach. At the time of contracting, Bob knew
of Alice's capacity to perform more than a single contract. Bob, thus,
had reason to know that if he breached, profits on other jobs being done
by Alice would not go in mitigation. Since he had no reason to expect
mitigation, he now has no reason to complain when profits on the
second contract do not go in mitigation.' 5'
The second argument rests on the risk of loss associated with agree-
ments to accomplish a specific result for a set price. In both contracts,
Alice agreed to do a specific job for a specific price: $120,000 in the
contract with Bob and $40,000 in the contract with Clara. If Alice's
costs on either of the contracts exceeded the contract price, Alice would
be required to absorb the loss. Since Alice risked such a loss in her
contract with Clara, a loss for which Bob would not be liable, it is argu-
able that Bob should not benefit from profits on the second contract. 152
150. See note 148 supra.
151. The argument applies the Hadley doctrine to limit the mitigation doctrine.
152. See Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Constr. Co., 177 Mass. 41, 58 N.H. 478 (1900) (Plain-
tiff subcontractors contracted with the owner to complete the job plaintiffs had started
under a contract with the breaching contractor. The court rejected the general con-
tractor's argument that plaintiffs' profits on the contract with the owner should go in
mitigation, saying:
If the contract [with the owner] had resulted in a loss to them fplaintiffs],
they could not have charged the defendant with the loss, to the increase of
their damages. As the contract resulted in a gain to them, there is no reason
why the defendant should receive this gain in diminution of the damages for
which it was liable.
Id. at 4, 58 N.E. at 479.
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Alice assumed the entire risk in both contracts and, thus, is presumably
entitled to all of the benefits.
The risk-of-loss argument does not address the essence of the
problem. If the mitigation doctrine dictates that reasonable actions
by Alice to reduce damages include contracting to complete the same
work, Bob should be liable for any losses sustained in this reasonable
attempt to mitigate. The party who breaches properly bears the cost
of reasonable, though unsuccessful, efforts to mitigate." 3  Bob should
bear the risk of loss if he reasonably should have foreseen such mitigat-
ing action.1 54 Because Alice could take on other work while perform-
ing her contract with Bob, however, it is unlikely that he would foresee
that Alice's post-breach activities would go in mitigation at all. He
would foresee neither loss nor gain as a result of Alice's postbreach
activities. If the profit on Alice's second contract were to go in mitiga-
tion, Bob would receive an unforeseen windfall.
Mitigation reduces liability-makes breach less costly-while leav-
ing the aggrieved party in as good a position as if there had been no
breach. While the aggrieved party in every contract has the duty to
mitigate, 155 the duty operates differently in different circumstances.
"Cover" activities in sales contracts usually do not reduce liability
except to the extent that consequential damages are involved. Ag-
grieved buyers and sellers have the option of recovering the difference
between market and contract prices if it is larger than the difference
between cover and contract prices. 156 If the aggrieved buyer or seller
of goods has a free option, cover becomes a mitigating duty only when
consequential damages are sought.15 7 In building contracts and similar
situations, post-breach activities of entrepreneurs who can perform
more than a single contract at the same time do not go in mitigation. In
153. See Duffy v. Woodcrest Builders, Inc., 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 137, 139-49, 196 A.2d
606, 608-10 (1963); Katz v. Exclusive Auto Leasing, Inc., 282 A.2d 866, 868 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1971); Hendrickson-McCabe Constr. Co. v. State, 120 Misc. 818, 822, 199
N.Y.S. 668, 671 (Ct. Cl. 1923). See also Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 214
F. Supp, 647, 652 (M.D. Tenn. 1963), citing RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 336(2)
(1932).
154. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 214 F. Supp. 647, 653 (M.D.
Tenn. 1963); note 151 supra and accompanying text.
155. See note 117 supra.
156. See notes 47-48, 103 supra.
157. Under the UCC only the buyer is entitled to consequential damages. See note
105 supra; see also Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283,
294 (7th Cir. 1974).
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employment contracts, the breaching employer consistently benefits
from the mitigation doctrine, thus encountering less pressure from the
legal system to perform. Other pressures may encourage performance,
of course. Concern for employee morale or personal relationships tend
to inhibit employer action. The mitigation doctrine in employment
contracts most often is significant when dealing with professional and
executive personnel, who are more likely to be employed under term
contracts than as employees at will. Union pressure is more important
at lower employment levels than contract restraints. The growth of
unionization at the professional level,1" 8 however, or the fear of its
growth, may inhibit employers from breaching employment contracts.
Whatever other pressures may exist, the expectancy damage system
itself rarely encourages employers to perform.
V. SPECIAL PROBLEMS
A. Windfall Damages
Except when the prospect of consequential damages discourages
breach, the expectancy damages system rarely encourages performance
except by those who made favorable contracts and who might be ex-
pected to perform in the absence of pressure from the legal system.
The system otherwise tends to neutrality as regards performance or
breach. In some cases, however, the system strongly encourages
breach.
Problem 17. Sand and Gravel. Alice, a large-scale vendor of sand
and gravel to the construction industry, and Bob, the owner of a large
tract of land, entered a written contract under which Alice received a
five-year right to remove all sand and gravel she wished to remove from
Bob's tract, with the limitation that she could take no more than would
leave the tract level with the land surrounding it. Alice agreed that, if
within the five-year period she failed to remove sufficient sand and
gravel to level Bob's tract, she would, at her expense, level the land in
relationship -to the land around it. Alice agreed to pay $250,000 in re-
turn for the five-year right.
Over the five-year period, Alice took all of the sand and gravel she
needed. She refused Bob's demand that she level the land. Bob filed
suit and at trial it was stipulated that it would cost $175,000 to level
the lot, that the land in its unleveled state was worth $90,000, and that
leveled, the land would be worth $100,000. How much should Bob
recover?
158. For example, among faculty members, see BUREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS,
FAcULTY ORoANIZING: SPECIAL REPORT (1976); FACULTY BARGMAINING IN THE SEVENTIES
App. A (T. Tice ed. 1973).
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Under the usual expectancy damage analysis, Bob would recover
$10,000, the difference between the value of what he would have
owned had Alice performed (a leveled lot worth $100,000) and the
value of what he did own as the result of her breach (an unleveled
lot worth $90,000)."' 9 With such an award, Bob would be in as good
a dollar position as if Alice had performed.
If the damages were limited to $10,000, however, Alice would
receive the sand and gravel for $165,000 less than she promised to pay.
Alice's expected costs were $250,000 plus the cost of leveling the tract
of land. A $10,000 award would permit Alice to receive the sand and
gravel for $260,000, rather than the $425,000 she promised to pay.
The economic pressures imposed by the legal system would encour-
age-almost demand-breach of the contract. In view of the profit-
able nature of the breach, Alice would be penalized by performance
and rewarded by breach. Should the system penalize performance and
reward breach? 6,
Spending $175,000 to level the tract and thereby increase its value
by $10,000 would make no economic sense. But Bob did not seek a
leveled tract: he sought a court order directing Alice to pay the promised
amount for the sand and gravel, leaving him to decide how the $175,000
should be spent. There might or might not be economic waste depend-
ing on how Bob spent the money. If Bob's recovery were limited to
$10,000, Alice could determine how the $165,000 balance would
be. If Alice were required to pay Bob the full $175,000 price,
the spending decision would be Bob's. The economic waste that
159. St c Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1963).
160. In Groves v. John Wunder Co., 205 Minn. 163, 286 N.W. 235 (1939), with
fact, iinilar to those of Problem 17, a divided court held plaintiff entitled to recover
the co t of leveling the lot although the difference in value between the leveled and un-
le'.led land was small. As far as I have been able to ascertain, no court has followed
the lead of the Groves case. See Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal and Mining Co., 382 P.2d
109 (Okla. 1963). In H.P. Droher & Sons v. Toushin, 250 Minn. 490, 498, 85 N.W.2d
273. 279 (1957), the Minnesota supreme court described the Groves case as decided "by
a di\,ided court, three members of the court concurring in the opinion, two dissenting,
and tom . , [taking] no part" and indicated that the majority opinion in Groves was
"bated, at least in part, on the fact that the breach of the contract was wilful and in
bad faith " For a similar characterization of Groves as based on the "wilful or inten-
tioiial" nature of the breach, see Hutson v. Chambless, 157 Tex. 193, 199, 300 S.W.2d
943, 946 (1957). Cf. P.G. Lake, Inc. v. Sheffield, 438 SAV.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969, wi it ref'd n.r.e.) (affirming an award of the cost of restoring the surface of the
land after the drilling of a dry oil well, but expressing a preference for the value differ-
ential rule of Pccvlhouse. The party who breached failed to prove the value differential
in this case)
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might stem from specific performance of the promise to level the hill
is not directly involved. The question is simply which of two parties
should decide how the $175,000 would be spent.
If Bob's recovery were limited to $10,000, Alice would profit substan-
tially from her breach. But an award of more than $10,000 would con-
stitute a windfall to Bob; his dollar position would be better than
if Alice had performed. As between the two, who should get the wind-
fall-Alice, who would profit from her breach, or Bob, who performed
as promised? While one might argue for a damage system that neither
encourages nor discourages performance, it is difficult to advance a
reasoned argument in favor of a damage system that affirmatively
encourages nonperformance. If the choice is between a $10,000 or a
$175,000 award, the better choice would seem to be the larger amount.
A statute establishing a state fund to receive windfall damages of
the kind generated in Problem 17 would remedy a part of the difficulty.
Under such legislation, Bob would receive $10,000, an amount suffi-
cient to elevate him to his expected dollar position 6" had Alice per-
formed, and the fund would receive the remaining $165,000. To avert
injury to Bob any such legislation should also award him court costs and
lawyers' fees. With such legislation, Alice would not be encouraged
to breach by visions of a reward for her failure to perform. In the
absence of such a statutory fund, however, it seems preferable to turn
the windfall over to the aggrieved party rather than to permit the
breaching party to retain it.
The proposed statutory solution might encourage economic waste.
Alice, faced with a $175,000 expenditure in any event, is just as likely
to spend the money leveling the hill as she is to pay the same amount
in damages. To avoid being neutral about spending $175,000 to
achieve a $10,000 increase in value, any legislative solution should
probably allow Alice to retain at least a small portion of the windfall-
perhaps ten percent-despite the fact that she would be encouraged
to breach.
B. Liquidated Damages
Subject to some judicially created limitations, the parties may stipu-
late in the contract the damages payable on breach. The traditional
161. While Bob's dollar position would be the same, he would not obtain what was
promised-a leveled lot-nor would he obtain the wherewithal to pay for what was
promised,
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treatment of liquidated damages is described in the following passage
from an 1888 Alabama case:
1. The court will always seek to ascertain the true and real inten-
tion of the contracting parties, giving due weight to the language or
words used in the contract, but not always being absolutely controlled
by them, when the enforcement of such contract operates with uncon-
scionable hardship, or otherwise works an injustice.
2. The mere denomination of the sum to be paid, as "liquidated
damages," or as "a penalty," is not conclusive on the court as to its real
character. Although designated as "liquidated damages," it may be
construed as a penalty; and often, when called a "penalty," it may be
held to be liquidated damages, where the intention to the contrary is
plain.
3. The courts are disposed to lean against any interpretation of a
contract which will make it liquidated damages; and in all cases of
doubtful intention, will pronounce the stipulated sum a penalty.
4. Where the payment of a smaller sum is secured by an obligation
to pay a larger sum, it will be held a penalty, and not liquidated
damages.
5. Where the agreement is for the performance or nonperformance
of a single act, or of several acts, or of several things which are but minor
parts of a single complex act, and the precise damage resulting from the
violation of each covenant is wholly uncertain, or incapable of being
ascertained save by conjecture, the parties may agree on a fixed sum
as liquidated damages, and the courts will so construe it, unless it is
clear, on other grounds, that a penalty was really intended.
6. When the contract provides for the performance of several acts
of different degrees of importance, and the damages resulting from the
violation of some, although not all of the provisions, are of easy ascer-
tainment, and one large gross sum is stipulated to be paid for the breach
of any, it [the sum] will be construed a penalty, and not as liquidated
damages.
7. When the agreement provides for the performance of one or more
acts, and the stipulation is to pay the same gross sum for a partial as
for a total or complete breach of performance, the sum will be construed
to be a penalty.
8. Whether the sum agreed to be paid is out of proportion to the act-
ual damages, which will probably be sustained by a breach, is a fact into
which the court will not enter on inquiry, if the intent is otherwise made
clear, that liquidated damages and not a penalty is in contemplation.
9. Where the agreement is in the alternative, to do one of two acts,
but is to pay a larger sum of money in the one event than in the other,
Vol. 1976:179]
Washington University Open Scholarship
232 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:179
the obligor having his election to do either, the amount thus agreed to
be paid will be held liquidated damages, and not a penalty.
10. In applying these rules, the controlling purpose of which is to
ascertain the real intention of the parties, the court will consider the
nature of the contract, the terms of the whole instrument, the conse-
quences naturally resulting from a breach of its stipulations, and the
peculiar circumstances surrounding the transaction; thus permitting each
case to stand, as far as possible, on its own merits and peculiarities.
These rules are believed to be sustained by the preponderance of
judicial decision .... 162
The rules set forth reflect the traditional judicial hostility to
liquidated damages. When in doubt, courts will invalidate the
clause. 6 ' The rules also show the strength of the expectancy con-
cept; stipulated damages larger than expectancy are not enforceable
because they are penal. 64 While the traditional hostility of the courts
towards liquidated damage clauses has softened somewhat over the
years, 65 the sum stipulated is still tested against the sum the expectancy
rules would yield.166
The judicial treatment of liquidated damage clauses varies among
jurisdictions, some holding the amount stipulated need only be a
162. Keeble v. Keeble, 85 Ala. 552, 555-57, 5 So. 149, 150-51 (1888).
163. Farthing-v. San Mateo Clinic, 143 Cal. App. 2d 385, 392, 299 P.2d 977, 981-82
(1956) ("[tlhe law does not favor either contracts in restraint of trade or agreements
for liquidated damages"); Hyman v. Cohen, 73 So. 2d 393, 402 (Fla. 1954) (dicta);
Donow v. Board of Trustees of S. Ill. Univ., 21 Ill. App. 3d 139, 148-49, 314 N.E.2d
704, 711 (1974) ("[i]f the exact nature [of a clause assessing parlaying fines against
teachers' salaries] is doubtful it is the trend to consider it as a penalty"); City of N.Y.
v. Brooklyn & Man. Ferry Co., 238 N.Y. 52, 56, 143 N.E. 788, 790 (1924); Testerman
v. Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
164. See Bricklayers Local 21 v. Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 519 F.2d 331, 333-34
(7th Cir. 1975); Ogden Dev. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 583, 586-87 (2d Cir.
1974); Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 662-68, 332 A.2d 651, 660-64 (1975); Bow-
bells Public School Dist. No. 14 v. Walker, 231 N.W.2d 173, 177 (N.D. 1975); S.L.
Rowland Constr. Co. v. Beall Pipe & Tank Corp., 14 Wash. App. 297, 540 P.2d 912
(1975).
165. See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1947); South-
west Eng'r Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
819 (1965) ("courts presently ... do not look with disfavor upon liquidated damage
stipulations"); D.H.M. Industries, Inc. v. Central Port Warehouse, Inc., 127 N.J. Super.
499, 503, 318 A.2d 20, 23 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), afl'd, 64 N.J. 548, 318 A.2d
19 (1974) ("[tlhe modem tendency of the courts [is to find] liquidated damage clauses
rather than penalties"); Gorco Constr. Co. v. Stein, 256 Minn. 476, 481, 99 N.W.2d 69,
74 (1959) ("[tlhe modem trend is to look with candor, if not with favor, upon a con-
tract provision for liquidated damages").
166. See note 164 supra.
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reasonable forecast on the facts known at the time of contractinglo 7 and
others that it must be reasonable when viewed with hindsight after the
contract is breached. 6 The cases can be summarized as follows: If
at the time a contract is made the parties include a clause fixing
damages in the event of a breach, the clause will be sustained if the
harm caused by the breach is difficult to ascertain and the amount set
by the parties is a reasonable forecast of the expectancy damages a
court would award absent such a clause. It is unclear whether the
damages must be difficult to ascertain at the time the contract is made,
at the time of the breach, or at both times. It is unclear whether a
167. Many cases say that the test of the parties' intention, or the reasonableness of
the parties' forecast, requires only that the court examine the situation when the contract
was made, without regard to the damages actually suffered. See Bricklayers Local 21
v. Thorleif Larsen & Son, Inc., 519 F.2d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 1975); Walter E. Heller
& Co. v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896, 898-99 (2d Cir. 1972); Traylor
v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 668, 332 A.2d 651, 663 (1975).
168. In Hutchison v. Tompkins, 259 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 1972), the court held that:
The better result . . . is to allow the liquidated damage clause to stand if
the damages are not readily ascertainable at the time the contract is drawn,
but to permit equity to relieve against the forfeiture if it appears unconscion-
able in light of the circumstances existing at the time of breach.
1d. at 132. The court hypothesized as an appropriate case for equitable intervention one
in which a $100,000 liquidated damage clause was contained in a contract for the sale
of land; at the time of contracting the clause was reasonable; and after vendee's breach,
the vendor resold the land for $2,000 under the original contract price. A somewhat
different approach was seen in Norwalk Door Closer Co. v. Eagle Lock & Screw Co.,
153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966):
The circumstances which the parties might reasonably foresee at the time of
making a contract could, in any given case, be vastly different from the circum-
stances which actually exist when a court is called upon to enforce the con-
tract. It is not the function of the court to determine by hindsight the reason-
ableness of the expectation of the parties at the time the contract was made,
but it is the function of the court at the time of enforcement to do justice. In
the ordinary contract action the court determines the just damages from evi-
dence offered. In a valid contract for liquidated damages, the parties are per-
mitted, in order to avoid the uncertainties and time-consuming effort involved,
to estimate in advance the reasonably probable foreseeable damages which
would arise in the event of a default. Implicit in the transaction is the prem-
ise that the sum agreed upon will be within the fair range of those just damages
which would be called for and provable had the parties resorted to proof. Con-
sequently, if the damage envisioned by the parties never occurs, the whole
premise for their agreed estimate vanishes, and, even if the contract was to be
construed as one for liquidated damages rather than one for a penalty, neither
justice nor the intent of the parties is served by enforcement. To enforce it
would amount in reality to the infliction of a penalty.
Id. at 689-90, 220 A.2d at 268. See also Wright v. Schutt Constr. Co., 262 Ore. 619,
624-26, 500 P.2d 1045, 1047-48 (1972). Cf. UNIFORMu COMMERCAL CODE § 2-718(1)
(damage may be liquidated, "but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of
the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach...").
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forecast reasonable at the time the contract is made will be sustained
if the damages actually suffered are much smaller or much larger than
the amount forecast.1 69
Problem 18. The Account Executive. Alice and Bob entered a
written employment contract under which Alice was to work for Bob
for two years for a salary of $15,000 for the first year and $20,000 for
the second year. Bob operated an advertising agency and Alice was
employed as a junior account executive. Under the contract, Alice
agreed to abide by rules and regulations governing all agency employees.
The contract provided that if either Alice or Bob failed to fulfill the
agreement "or any part thereof, or any stipulation therein contained,
such party agrees to pay the other the sum of $5,000, the amount being
viewed by the parties s liquidated damages and not a penalty." Alice
breached the contract by refusing to continue working after the first three
months. In a suit by Bob against Alice, would Bob be able to enforce
the "liquidated damage" clause?
Although Bob could recover expectancy damages if it would cost him
more to replace Alice for the 21 months remaining on the contract than
he had promised to pay her over that period, 170 it is doubtful that he
could waive actual damages and collect $5,000 under the liquidated
damage clause even if he could demonstrate that the actual damages
were approximately $5,000. The $5,000 clause applied both to major
and minor breaches of rules and regulations. Applied to minor
breaches-coming to work five minutes late, or quitting a week
before termination-the $5,000 would be deemed a penalty. Even
if the actual breach were major, as it was, many courts would refuse
to enforce the clause because it could have been applied to a minor
breach.171 In employment contract cases, the courts' reluctance to vali-
date large liquidated damage clauses may be explained by the fact that
the threat of large and certain damages discourages employees from
electing to pay damages in lieu of performing and smacks of involun-
tary servitude. (Similar reasoning supports the common refusal of
courts to direct that an employee specifically perform the employment
169. See notes 162-68 supra.
170. See, e.g., Roth v. Speck, 126 A.2d 153, 155 (D.C. Ct. App. 1956).
171. See Webster v. Garrette, 10 Cal. App. 2d 610, 615, 52 P.2d 550, 552 (1935);
Oldis v. Grosse-Rhode, 35 Colo. App. 46, 51-52, 528 P.2d 944, 947 (1974); McMurray
v. Faust, 224 Iowa 50, 58-59, 276 N.W. 95, 100 (1937); Wilt v. Waterfield, 273 S.W.2d
290, 295-96 (Mo. 1954). Cf. Connelly v. Zee, 366 F. Supp. 1229, 1231-32 (D.V.I.
1973) (liquidated damage clause rescued from usual rule because "the parties bad in
mind only such serious defaults as would probably result in termination of the lease").
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contract.)172
Most litigation over liquidated damages involves allegations that
the amount stipulated is larger than an expectancy analysis would yield
and thus amounts to a penalty. The theory seems to be that the law
abhors a penalty,173 and any damage much above expectancy amounts
to a penalty.'7 4  Pressuring performance by stipulating a damage
figure substantially above the expectancy level is often considered a
violation of public policy, even when the parties occupy equal bargain-
ing positions. 175  In a system designed to minimize government inter-
172. See Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 875-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
173. A "penalty" is described in Garrett v. Coast & S. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 9
Cal. 3d 731, 511 P.2d 1197, 108 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1973), as a provision which
operates to compel performance of an act . . . and usually becomes effec-
tive only in the event of default. . . upon which a forfeiture is compelled with-
out regard to the actual damages sustained by the party aggrieved by the
breach. . . . The characteristic feature of a penalty is its lack of proportional
relation to the damages which may actually flow from failure to perform under
a contract.
Id. at 739, 511 P.2d at 1202, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 850. See Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind.
226, 231, 301 N.E.2d 641, 644 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974).
174. The courts, of course, do not insist that the amount of damages established in
the contract be identical with the expectancy damages which are reasonably foreseeable
or suffered. They inquire whether the sum stipulated is "grossly disproportionate" to
the damages actually sustained. See, e.g., Walker v. Rocky Mountain Rec. Corp., 29
Utah 2d 274, 280, 508 P.2d 538, 542 (1973). In Wright v. Schutt Constr. Co., 262
Ore. 619, 500 P.2d 1045 (1972), the court said it would not invalidate a liquidated dam-
age because of the amount listed unless that amount "is 'grossly disproportionate,' or has
no 'reasonable relation' to the probable loss, as anticipated at the time of the contract."
Id. at 624-25, 500 P.2d at 1047.
175. See Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 301 N.E.2d 641 (1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 921 (1974) (clause in a land sale contract between two noncommercial parties
found to be a penalty); In re Associated Gen. Contractors v. Savin Bros., Inc., 45 App.
Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1974), affd, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373
N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975) (contract between a national trade association and a large con-
tractor); Hofer v. W.M. Scott Livestock Co., 201 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1972) (penalty
found in sales agreement between religious organization and a livestock company and
an individual); Babler Bros., Inc. v. Hebener, 267 Ore. 414, 517 P.2d 653 (1973) (pen-
alty found in contract between road contractor and quarry operators). But cf. Blank
v. Borden, II Cal. 3d 963, 524 P.2d 127, 115 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1974):
[lit is important to recognize that we are not here concerned with a situation
wherein the party who seeks to enforce the clause enjoyed a vastly superior
bargaining position at the time the contract was entered into. On the contrary,
the contract before us was one which was freely negotiated by parties dealing
at arm's length. While contracts having characteristics of adhesion must be
carefully scrutinized in order to insure that provisions therein which speak in
terms of alternative performance but in fact exact a penalty are not enforced
... . we believe that in circumstances such as those before us interference
with party autonomy is less justified.
Id. at 972, 524 P.2d at 132, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 36. See generally Sweet, Liquidated Dam-
ages in California, 60 CAL. L. REv. 84 (1972).
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vention,1 7 6 it is odd that courts interpose their judgment when the
parties have agreed to a damage assessment and no overreaching or
unconscionability is involved.
Courts are much more willing to enforce liquidated damage agree-
ments when the amount stipulated by the parties falls below the
expectancy level. 177  Performance is not pressured by such awards.
In fact, just the reverse is true in many cases: breach is encouraged
when the cost of breach is low.
While damages stipulated at a level substantially above or below the
expectancy level should lead to inquiries about the equality of bargain-
ing power and the possibility of abuse of such power,178 it is difficult
176. GILMORE 14-15.
177. See Frank's Nursery Sales, Inc. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 388 F. Supp. 76,
83 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (validating a $13,500 liquidated damage award as not shocking
the conscience of the court in face of evidence of actual damages of $18,823.81); Inter-
national Distrib. Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 385 F. Supp. 871, 874 (D.D.C. 1974)
(award of $446 liquidated damages when loss was $57,000); Ray Farmers Union Eleva-
tor Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1975) (denying damages in excess of the
amount stipulated); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Shulman, 84 Wash. 2d 433, 440,
526 P.2d 1210, 1214-15 (1974).
178. See Mahoney v. Tingley, 85 Wash. 2d 95, 529 P.2d 1068 (1975), rev'g 10
Wash. App. 814, 520 P.2d 628 (1974). The appellate court had held that:
The issue to be determined is whether, at the time the stipulation was entered
into, the forecast of damages was unreasonably high or unreasonably low for
the breach involved. If the forecast of damages is unreasonably high, the stip-
ulation calls for a nonenforceable penalty. If the forecast is unreasonably low,
a court will not penalize the innocent party by limiting his recovery to the
damages stipulated [citing C. McCoRMIcK, DAMAoES 608 (1935), and cases
cited therein].
10 Wash. App. at 818-19, 520 P.2d at 633. In reversing, the supreme court recognized
the existence of authorities supporting the appellate court's conclusion, but said:
There is, however, contrary authority. For example, in Kinston v. Suddreth,
266 N.C. 618, 146 S.E.2d 660 (1966), the argument was made that a liquidated
damages clause, which stipulated an amount less than actual damages, was a
penalty and unenforceable. The court refused even to consider the nature of
the clause at issue, holding that an injured party cannot recover damages be-
yond the amount stipulated in a liquidated damages clause. We believe that
the view expressed by the North Carolina court is the better one.
[Un addition to a background of case law which suggests that provisions for
liquidated damages will ordinarily be upheld by the courts, there are practical
considerations which lend further support to our decision . . . . We must as-
sume that the seller considered the certainty of a liquidated damages clause to
be preferable to the risk of seeking actual damages in the event of the pur-
chasers' breach. We must also assume that the purchasers understood and re-
lied upon the liability limitation stipulated .. .. Furthermore, it cannot be
ignored that the seller, in making an earnest money agreement, can simply de-
mand more protection-a larger deposit of earnest money-or even dispense
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to understand why courts refuse to enforce the stipulation in the
absence of overreaching.
A system that permitted parties of equal bargaining power to stipu-
late the damages assessable on breach of their contract, without refer-
ence to expectancy damages, would have much to recommend it.17 9
When the breach is clear, as it sometimes is, out-of-court settlement
is likely. Even if the issue of breach is unclear and the case is litigated,
the trial itself will be simplified substantially by eliminating the damage
issue. If the parties are confident that the damage clause will be sus-
tained, they can decide to perform or breach with certain knowledge
of the consequences.
If the stipulated amount is nominal, or much less than the value of
full performance, a court may find insufficient consideration to support
the contract;' but if parties of equal bargaining strength wish to deal
on that basis, nothing is gained by judicial interference.
C. One-Sale-Short
Problem 19. The New Car. Alice, an automobile dealer, and Bob,
a school teacher, entered a written contract in September 1974. Alice
agreed to sell and Bob to buy a new 1975 model car, serial #2758-098-
76, for $5,200. Bob refused to take delivery of the car and Alice resold
it to Clara for $5,200. Alice could order cars identical to the one Bob
agreed to buy, at any time. The car cost Alice $4,000. What should
Alice rccover in a suit against Bob?
The situation is similar to the variation of Problem 3 in which a used
car was sold for its market price of $3,000 after the buyer refused to
take delivery.' In Problem 3, Alice could recover only nomi-
with a liquidated damages provision altogether. Except where extraordinary
circumstances are involved such as fraud or serious overreaching by the pur-
chaser, a seller who chooses to utilize the device of liquidated damages in an
earnest money agreement, with its attendant features of certainty and reliance
upon the limitation, cannot avoid the effect of that agreement.
85 Wash. 2d at 99-100, 529 P.2d at 1070-71.
179. See Blank v. Borden, 11 Cal. 3d 963, 972, 524 P.2d 127, 132, 115 Cal. Rptr.
31, 36 (1974).
180. [A] promise by the claimant to accept a smaller amount in satisfaction of
the existing liquidated debt has seldom been enforced. The payment of an
amount that is admittedly due is not regarded as sufficient reason for enforcing
a creditor's promise to give up the balance of his claim.
5 A. CORBIN, CoRIN ON CONTRACTs 336 (1964). But see note 177 supra.
181. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text.
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nal damages, because such a recovery would have left her in as
good a position as if the contract had been performed. Are the facts
of Problem 19 sufficiently different from those of Problem 3 to warrant
a different result?
In Problem 19, Alice could make the sale to Clara whether or not
Bob breached. Alice had, for practical purposes, an unlimited supply
of cars identical to the one Bob agreed to buy. She could have filled
Clara's order without regard to action or inaction by Bob. In Problem
3, however, Alice, holding a used car for sale, did not have a factory
source from which to obtain a duplicate of the car she had contracted to
sell to Bob. If Bob had performed, she would not have been able to
sell an identical item to a new buyer. To some extent-mileage, prior
ownership, prior accident record, color, condition of tires, engine and
body, etc.-the used car was unique. In theory at least, Bob's breach
made it possible for Alice to resell the same used car she had con-
tracted to sell to him. The ability of a new-car dealer to make a second
sale of an identical item without regard to the original buyer's perform-
ance is the major difference between Problems 19 and 3; that differ-
ence calls for a different result.
The seller of a used car is in a position like that of the employee
in Problem 14, who, as a result of the employment contract, cannot sell
his services during the hours of the working day committed to the
original employer.'82 As with the employee, were it not for Bob's
failure to perform, no additional commitment could be made concern-
ing the specific car. The market value of the car, like earnings of the
employee after breach, mitigates damages because the resale would not
have been possible but for the breach.
The seller in Problem 19 would not reach her expectancy goal if
granted only nominal damages. Because she could sell the car to Clara
without regard to Bob's breach, and because she would have made a
profit on the sale to Clara without Bob's breach, Alice would have made
one sale more during the 1975 model year had Bob performed. Thus,
nominal damages would leave Alice with a $1,200 loss of profits. Like
the plumbing contractor in Problem 16, who, because of her ability to
take on additional work, can avoid a setoff of the profits on her second
contract, Alice can make a second sale without regard to Bob's breach.1 3
182. See notes 131-45 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 149-58 supra and accompanying text,
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In Problem 19, Alice should be awarded $1,200 in lost profits.1 4
Awarding a lesser amount would leave her in a less favorable position
than if the buyer had performed.
The contract-price-minus-market-price formula for expectancy as-
sumes that the seller has a limited supply of goods and that the resale
after breach is only possible because the original buyer has failed to
perform as promised. Whenever the seller's supply is ample, the
formula does not achieve expectancy because the ibility to resell is
unrelated to the breach.
The Uniform Commercial Code 85 provides damages based on the
loss of profit, rather than the difference between contract and market
price, whenever the latter would fall short of putting the seller in as
good a position as performance would have done. Cases involving "all
standard priced goods" are said to fall within this provision." 6
It is difficult to understand why the lost-profits measure of damages
is appropriate when the goods have standard prices, unless "standard
priced goods" mean goods produced in large quantities by producers
184. See Torkomian v. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 485-86, 97 A. 760, 761-62 (1916);
Service Co. v. Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 415-17, 131 S.E.2d 9, 21 (1963). For a Uni-
form Sales Act case, see Stewart v. Hansen, 62 Utah 281, 285-86, 218 P. 959, 960-62
(1923).
185. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708(2). The cases fall into three categories:
(1) Buyer's breach of a contract to buy specialized goods having no general market
price. See Alter & Sons, Inc. v. United Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 959,
966 (S.D. Ill. 1973) (pumping equipment for a nuclear power plant); Anchorage Cent.
Distrib. Co. v. Van Wormer & Rodrigues, Inc., 443 P.2d 596, 599 (Alas. 1968) (coins
commemorating Anchorage's centennial); Detroit Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 25
Mich. App. 478, 485-89, 181 N.W.2d 828, 832-34 (1970); Chicago Roller Skate Mfg.
Co. v. Sokol Mfg. Co., 185 Neb. 515, 517-18, 177 N.W.2d 25, 27 (1970) (parts for
skate boards); Industrial Circuits Co. v. Terminal Communications, Inc., 26 N.C. App.
536, 541-44, 216 S.E.2d 919, 922-24 (1975) (printed electronic circuits).
(2) Buyer's breach of contract causing seller to lose sales. See Famous Knitwear
Corp. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 493 F.2d 251, 253-55 (4th Cir. 1974); Distribu-Dor, Inc. v.
Karadanis, 11 Cal. App. 3d 463, 469-70, 90 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235-36 (1970) (lost-volume
analysis, seller was a middleman); Coast Indus. Inc. v. Noonan, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 333,
336-38, 231 A.2d 663, 665-66 (1967); Neri v. Retail Marine Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285
N.E.2d 311, 334 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1972).
(3) Buyer breaching a contract to buy goods which are not specialized but for which
there is no market. See Holiday Mfg. Co. v. B.A.S.F. Systems, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 1096,
1105 (D. Neb. 1974) (lost profits under § 2-708(2); no indication why the contract-
price-market-price test of § 2-708(1) was not used); Timber Access Indus. v. U.S. Ply-
wood-Champion Papers, Inc., 263 Ore. 509. 524-25, 503 P.2d 482, 489-90 (1972).
186. UNFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-708, Comment 2.
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able to establish standard prices. If "standard priced" merely means
that the contract and market prices are the same, the standard pricing
arrangement is irrelevant in deciding that the contract-price-market-
price formula is inadequate to put the aggrieved seller in as good a posi-
tion as if there had been performance. The supply of goods, not the
pricing arrangement, determines the outcome.
In many cases, and probably in most commercial contexts, sellers
have practically unlimited supplies of identical goods and a second sale
is not dependent on the buyer's breach. The recovery of lost profits,
therefore, should be the norm for commercial sales, and not the excep-
tion, if expectancy is the goal. By permitting the recovery of lost
profits only if the contract-price-market-price formula does not yield
expectancy, the Code appears to establish the lost-profit measure as the
exception rather than the rule. The courts have not been reluctant to
use section 2-708(2), however, and the awarding of lost profits domi-
nates the reported cases."5 7 The lost-profits award, by raising the cost
of the breach, tends to apply greater pressure on the buyer to perform.
D. Action for the Price
If a buyer of goods or services repudiates a contract when the goods
or services involved have a market price of zero-when they cannot
be sold to anyone else-the aggrieved seller can recover the full con-
tract price under the contract-price-minus-market-price formula. Thus,
187. The index to volumes 1-18 of the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service
shows 21 cases which apply either § 2-708(1) or § 2-708(2) on behalf of an aggrieved
seller. Of these, 14 find the lost-profit measure appropriate and 7 award the contract-
price-market-price differential. For the cases applying § 2-708(2), see note 185 supra;
Alter & Sons, Inc. v. United Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 959 (S.D. Ill.
1973). See also City of Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159, 165-66 (6th
Cir. 1973); American Metal Climax, Inc. v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 16 UCC REP. SERv. 101,
113-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); White Motor Corp. v. Northland Ins. Co., 315 F. Supp. 689,
694 (D.S.D. 1970); Jericho Sash & Door Co. v. Building Erectors, Inc., 362 Mass. 871,
286 N.E.2d 343 (1972) (rescript opinion). The § 2-708 index of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code Reporting Service cites the following cases which apply the contract-price-
market-price formula of § 2-708(1): In re Augustin Bros. Co., 460 F.2d 376, 382 (8th
Cir. 1972); Bache & Co. v. International Controls Corp., 339 F. Supp. 341, 352-53
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 469 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972); Procter & Gamble v. Lawrence Am.
Field Warehousing Corp., 16 N.Y.2d 334, 354-55, 213 N.E.2d 873, 878, 266 N.Y.S.2d
785, 792-93 (1965); Miller v. Belk, 23 N.C. App. 1, 6, 207 S.E.2d 792, 795 (1974);
Jagger Bros., Inc. v. Technical Textile Co., 202 Pa. Super. 639, 198 A.2d 888 (1964);
French v. Sotheby & Co., 470 P.2d 318, 322 (Okla. 1970); Carnes Constr. Co. v. Rich-
ards & Conover Steel & Supply Co., 10 UCC RiP. SEuV. 797, 803 (Okla. Ct. App.
1972).
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when an employee is dismissed in violation of a one-year employ-
ment contract with six months yet to run, and the employee cannot find
other employment during the balance of the contract term, the
employee can recover six months' salary.' 8 The market value of the
employee's services during the remaining six-month period is zero.
The full contract price must be paid although the employee rendered
no services to the employer during the balance of the term. When a
buyer breaches a contract for sale of goods and the seller cannot resell
the goods, the seller, while retaining the goods, can recover the full
contract price, or, at a minimum, the contract price minus whatever sal-
vage value the goods have.
On the surface, at least, no special rule is necessary when the goods
involved cannot be resold. If the market price of the item sold is zero,
applying the normal contract-price-market-price formula leads to recov-
ery of the contract price. The Uniform Commercial Code, however,
has developed a special rule. In contracts for the sale of goods, when
the market price is zero, or approximates zero, section 2-709 of the
Code requires the seller to hold the goods for the buyer and to hand
them over to the buyer upon payment of a judgment for the price.3 9
If the seller resells the goods before collecting the judgment, the buyer
is entitled to have the proceeds of the resale credited against the judg-
ment. In the absence of resale pending collection of judgment, a price
action under section 2-709 amounts to a suit for specific performance.
The requirement that the proceeds of resale be deducted from a
judgment under section 2-709 is completely at odds with the seller's
option to cover or not in other actions for breach of contract for the
sale of goods. It also conflicts with the rule in other actions that market
price is fixed at the time of breach. In an action under section 2-708
(1), for instance, the seller probably can recover the contract-price-
market-price differential regardless of whether the goods thereafter
sold for more than the market price. 190 And if the market price is very
low at the time of breach, and rises rapidly thereafter, permitting a re-
sale at a higher price, the buyer who breaches remains liable for the
difference between the contract price and the low market price at the
188. See, e.g., Rabago-Alvarez v. Dart Indus., Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 97-99, 127
Cal. Rptr, 222, 225-27 (1976).
189. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-709.
190, See note 47 supra.
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time the buyer learned of the breach. Under section 2-709, however,
the later resale price is deducted from the award.
Nothing in the Code, however, expressly requires the aggrieved
party to use section 2-709 in seeking expectancy damages."9' The
seller seems to have the option of using the contract-price-market-price
formula of section 2-708(1). Under it, the seller can recover the con-
tract price minus zero, or almost zero, and need not hold the goods
for the buyer. The dollar recovery will be close to that awarded under
section 2-709 without the burden of holding the goods. And under
section 2-708(1) whatever is gained by a postbreach resale remains
the seller's property. Unless section 2-709 is the exclusive remedy
when "the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell ...
[the goods] at a reasonable price,"' 2 the aggrieved seller would be
foolish to employ section 2-709 instead of section 2-708(1).
Nor will section 2-709 necessarily benefit the buyer. Apparently,
section 2-709 simply permits a breaching buyer to acquire the goods
when compelled by a judgment to pay the full contract price. If the
goods in fact have no market value, however, the buyer gets nothing
of value when the goods are delivered. If the goods have value but
cannot be resold "at a reasonable price," the buyer will get goods of
some value but goods the buyer does not want. The seller, who is in the
business of selling, normally will find it easier to dispose of the goods
than will -the buyer. And if the goods are sold at market by the buyer,
he or she will occupy exactly the same position as if the seller had ob-
tained the contract-price-market-price differential under section 2-708
(1); and a section 2-708(1) recovery would have saved the buyer the
time and trouble of disposing of the goods.
If the goods are specially manufactured for the buyer and unusable
by anyone else, a rule requiring the seller to turn the goods over to the
buyer seems economically efficient. If the buyer does not use the
goods, no one else will. The buyer, however, might have repudiated
for any number of reasons. The buyer might go out of business com-
pletely, or modify production in a way that precludes use of the goods
except at great economic sacrifice. If so, the buyer has no more use
for the goods than anyone else. If the repudiation is based on a deci-
sion that the price is too high to permit the profitable use of the goods,
however, delivery to the buyer on payment of the contract price makes
191. UNiFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-703, establishing the seller's remedies, does
not appear to give exclusivity to any single remedy.
192. UNwoRm CoMMERCIAL CODE § 2-709(1) (b).
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economic sense by avoiding complete economic waste of the seller's
efforts. Since the buyer is forced to pay the contract price in any event
-whether he or she gets the goods or not-the buyer who breaches
because the price is too high should be able to cut losses by using the
goods once payment is made.
Even if section 2-709 would eliminate some waste, however, it is dif-
ficult to find a case in which the prospect of a recovery greater than
that available under section 2-708 would induce the seller to choose
the price remedy. 193
VI. NON-EXPECTANCY RECOVERIES
While this Article is concerned principally with the traditional theory
of expectancy damages, the parties often employ other theories of
recovery when an enforceable promise is breached. Effective evalua-
tion of the expectancy system therefore requires examination of its role
within the context of the entire system of money recoveries available
in suits for failure to perform as promised.
The other theories may be summarized as follows:
1. Reliance. When a promise supported by consideration is
breached and expectancy damages are too remote and speculative to
be ascertained, the injured party may recover expenses incurred in
reasonable reliance on the other party's promise. The amount recover-
able is limited by the same foreseeability test that limits recovery of
expectancy damages. 194
2. Restitution. The injured party may recover the value of the per-
formance rendered prior to the breach. The recovery is not limited
by the contract price. Restitution is not available if the injured party
has performed fully and the breach is the refusal to pay money due
and owing.' 95
3. Restitution for the party in default. The party who breaches
after rendering nonreturnable services may recover the value of the
193. But see City of Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1973).
Parking meters were manufactured by Rockwell for the City, delivery was refused, and
the meters were unsold and unsalable. The § 2-709 recovery allowed-the purchase
price-was identical with what a contract-price-market-price recovery under § 2-708(1)
would have been, the market price of the meters apparently having been zero. Id. at
165.
194. See notes 198-207 infra and accompanying text.
195. See notes 208-19 infra and accompanying text.
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benefit conferred on the other party to the extent that such benefit
exceeds the damages caused by the breach. Such recovery is limited
to a maximum of the pro rata share of the contract price.10
4. Promissory estoppel. The aggrieved party may recover an
amount sufficient to eliminate the injustice resulting from the failure
of the breaching party to perform as promised.9 7
A. Reliance Damages
When it is impossible to assess expectancy damages because of the
difficulty of calculating the expectancy position of the aggrieved party,
courts may award the expenses incurred in reasonable reliance on
the other party's promises. 198
Problem 20. A Revolutionary Switch. In January, Alice, a furnace
manufacturer, rented space for the National Furnace Show to be held
in Birmingham, Alabama, in the fall. She agreed to pay $2,000 for the
space. Early in August, Alice wrote the following letter to the K. & Q.
Transit Company:
I want to arrange for the shipment of 40 parcels from my plant
site in Los Angeles to Birmingham, Alabama, for the September
22-25 National Furnace Show. The parcels must arrive in Bir-
mingham by September 20 so that they can be unpacked and the
parts assembled. Each parcel will contain a part of a furnace. I
plan to unveil for the first time a revolutionary new burner mech-
anism, a mechanism that will convert from gas to oil or to coal with
a flick of a switch. It is imperative that the parcels arrive in time.
Unless we can assemble and demonstrate the burner, the whole
venture will be a waste of time and money. If we can demon-
strate, I am confident that I can sell two million dollars in furnaces
at the show. What do you suggest concerning a special handling
to assure that the parcels arrive?
196. See notes 220-26 infra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 227-28 infra and accompanying text.
198. See In re Las Colinas, Inc., 453 F.2d 911, 914 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1067 (1972) (citing RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs § 333 (1932)); O'Bier v.
Safe-Buy Real Estate Agency, Inc., 256 Ark. 574, 576, 509 S.W.2d 292, 293 (1974);
Mendoyoma, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 8 Cal. App. 3d 873, 881, 87 Cal. Rptr. 740,
745 (1970); Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King Int'l, Inc., 267 So. 2d 853, 856 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1972) (dicta: "[tlhe basic reason for such allowance is that profits may be too
speculative to form a part of any damage award"); King v. Beatrice Foods Co., 89 Idaho
52, 57, 402 P.2d 966, 967 (1965); C.C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long Mfg. Co., 260
Iowa 30, 35, 148 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1967); Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages: I & 2, 46 YALE LJ. 52, 373 (1936, 1937).
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K. & Q. answered that no special handling was necessary and that if the
parcels were delivered to their agent in Los Angeles by September 1,
they would guarantee delivery in plenty of time. Alice delivered the 40
parcels to the K. & Q. agent on August 31st. Thirty-nine of the 40
parcels arrived in Birmingham on September 18. The 40th parcel, con-
taining the "revolutionary" switching mechanism, arrived on September
29, four days after the show closed. Consequently, Alice could not
demonstrate the new switching device and received no orders.
Alice filed suit for $200,000, the amount of profits allegedly lost as
a result of her failure to demonstrate the new burner at the show. The
court ruled that Alice could not recover lost profits because she could
not show that such profits would have resulted had the 40th parcel
arrived and the burner been demonstrated. Such damages were "too
remote and speculative" to be awarded.
The court gave Alice leave to amend, however, and she then
requested "reliance" damages as follows:
(i) $1,750
(ii) $6,000
(iii) $ 200
(iv) $ 200
(v) $2,000
(vi) $7,500
(vii) $ 900
- Travel and hotel bills for Alice and four employees
- Salaries paid to the four employees and to Alice
from September 19 (when they flew from Los
Angeles to Birmingham) to September 25 (when
they returned to Los Angeles)
- Cost of shipping the 40 parcels from Los Angeles
to Birmingham (prepaid)
- Cost of shipping the 40 parcels from Birmingham
to Los Angeles
- Cost of booth rental
- Cost of cocktail party sponsored by Alice on Sep-
tember 22 for prospective customers, which expen-
diture was wasted when she was unable to demon-
strate the "revolutionary" switch
- Cost of fruitless efforts made on September 20 and
21 to have a substitute switch shipped to Birming-
ham
As a result of K. & Q.'s breach, Alice's expenditures in relationship
to the National Furnace Show were commercially useless. *Travel
and hotel costs (i), salaries paid (ii), and shipping costs (iii and iv)
all were expenditures made in reasonable reliance that K. & Q. would
deliver the parcels as promised, and were foreseeable by K. & Q.
These expenses would be included in a reliance award to Alice. 1 9'
199. See Security Store & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo. App. 175,
179-80, 51 S.W.2d 572, 574-75 (1932), the case on which Problem 20 was modeled. See
Vol. 1976:179] 245
Washington University Open Scholarship
246 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:179
Unless the four employees were hired solely for the Furnace Show,
they probably would have drawn the same salaries whether or not
Alice contracted with K. & Q. Arguably, therefore, the $6,000 salary
expense was incurred not in reliance on K. & Q. performing as
promised, but as a normal business expense.200 But Alice still should
recover the $6,000 salary expense on the theory that she, reasonably
and foreseeably relying on K. &. Q.'s promise, diverted her own efforts
and those of her employees from other company-related, presumably
profitable, activities.201
The obligation to rent the booth at the Furnace Show for $2,000 was
incurred before K. & Q. committed itself to deliver the parcels and,
therefore, was not an expense incurred in direct reliance on the con-
tract. If K. & Q. were a common carrier, however, it would be obliged to
carry any nondangerous goods Alice wished to ship. Arguably, there-
fore, the $2,000 rental expense was made in reliance on K. & Q. per-.
forming its duties as a common carrier.20 2
K. & Q.'s obligation to pay the $7,500 cocktail party expense would
depend on a finding that such an expenditure was foreseeable when
Alice and K. & Q. entered the contract.2 °3 Although apparently far
removed from a contract to carry parcels to a furnace show, the cock-
also Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp. 504, 508-09 (D.
Conn. 1975); Saddler v. United States, 287 F.2d 411, 415-16 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Schnierow
v. Boutagy, 33 Cal. App. 336, 337, 164 P. 1132, 1133 (1917); King v. Beatrice Foods
Co., 89 Idaho 52, 57, 402 P.2d 966, 968 (1965); Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey,
265 Ill. App. 542, 552-53 (1932).
200. See Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542, 553 (1932) (defend-
ant not required to reimburse plaintiff for "salaries paid regular officials of the
[plaintiff] corporation who were presumed to be receiving such salaries by reason of
their position").
201. See, e.g., Security Store & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo. App.
175, 51 S.W.2d 572 (1932). See also Mendoyoma, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 8 Cal.
App. 3d 873, 881-82, 87 Cal. Rptr. 740, 745 (1970); C.C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long
Mfg. Co., 260 Iowa 30, 35, 148 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1967) (plaintiff awarded the value
of his own services and those of two employees).
202. Security Store & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express Co., 227 Mo. App. 173,
184, 51 S.W.2d 572, 577 (1932).
203. E.g., Mendoyoma, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 8 Cal. App. 3d 873, 880, 87
Cal. Rptr. 740, 744 (1970) (plaintiff had intended to raise capital by sale of stock but
later decided to raise funds by means of loans; defendant not liable for the interest paid
since the loans were not foreseeable); Freund v. Washington Square Press, Inc., 34
N.Y.2d 379, 383, 314 N.E.2d 419, 421, 357 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1974) (lost profits not
available to plaintiff because too speculative to be awarded). See also Gurney Indus.,
Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588, 598-99 (4th Cir. 1972).
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tail party would be foreseeable if such entertaining were the norm in
the industry and K. & Q. had reason to know of that norm. Whatever
the norm, if K. & Q. had no reason to anticipate such an expenditure,
Alice could not recover the $7,500 even though K. & Q.'s breach made
the expenditure a useless one.204
It is difficult to view the $900 expenditure in search of alternate
transportation as an expenditure in reliance on K. & Q.'s performing as
promised. Although the expenditure would have been unnecessary
but for K. & Q.'s breach, Alice incurred the expense after she knew
that K. & Q. had breached, and therefore was not relying on perform-
ance by K. & Q. 215
In its pure form, the reliance damage test returns the aggrieved party
to the position occupied prior to having entered the contract. Since the
expectancy position cannot be determined, leaving the aggrieved party
in status quo ante seems a reasonable alternative. At least the aggrieved
party is not affirmatively harmed by the breach. Because of the limita-
tions of the foreseeability test and the denial of recovery for reasonable
postbreach efforts to repair the damage done, however, the aggrieved
party is unlikely to achieve precontract status. The aggrieved party may
end up aggrieved indeed. The interest in avoiding the imposition of
large and unforeseen damages on the party who breached outweighs
the interest in returning the aggrieved party to her or his precontract
position. The risk of loss is shared by both parties.
Even though a court cannot determine the aggrieved party's expect-
ancy position with sufficient accuracy to award expectancy damages, if
the breaching party can show that the aggrieved party would have lost
money absent a breach, the theory would permit only nominal dam-
ages °.20  If K. & Q. could show that the burner, if assembled, would
204. See Schnierow v. Boutagy, 33 Cal. App. 336, 337, 164 P. 1132, 1133 (1917)
("the parties, when they made the contract, did not contemplate that plaintiff ...
should give his property away or sell it at a sacrifice"); C.C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v.
Long Mfg. Co., 260 Iowa 30, 35, 148 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1967).
205. See Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542, 551-52 (1932) (no
right to recover for expenses incurred in obtaining an injunction after defendant repudi-
ated the contract); cf. Brown Bros. Equip. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 51 Mich.
App. 448, 451, 215 N.W.2d 591, 593 (1974) (no right to recover cost incurred in relo-
cating facilities after defendant breached contract). If Alice's $900 expenditure is
viewed as a reasonable effort to mitigate damages, it might be recovered. See Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 214 F. Supp. 647, 652 (M.D. Tenn. 1963); Cain Shoes,
Inc. v. Gunn, 194 Kan. 381, 384, 399 P.2d 831, 834 (1965).
206. See notes 33-34 supra. See also In re Yeager Co., 227 F. Supp. 92, 98-99 (N.D.
Ohio 1963); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 333(d) (1932); Fuller & Perdue, supra
note 198, at 79.
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have exploded causing injuries, or that it would have functioned so im-
perfectly that no sales would have been made, reliance damages would
be inappropriate. 217  In such situations, Alice's reliance expenditures
would have been useless even if K. & Q. had performed as promised.
B. Restitution
Although a claim for reliance damages generally succeeds only when
expectancy damages cannot be awarded,20 8 restitution is available to
the aggrieved party whether or not expectancy damages are avail-
able.209 In seeking restitution, the aggrieved party asks for the return
of the dollar equivalent or value of the performance in a context in
which return of the subject of the contract is not feasible.2 10 Thus,
restitution is irrelevant to a wholly executory contract, in which neither
party has given anything of value to the other; the remedy is most use-
ful in construction cases21' and is available in some service-contract
situations.2 12
Problem 21. The Owner's Mistake. Alice entered a contract to
build a house for Bob. Alice agreed to construct the house according
to plans and specifications supplied by Bob and Bob agreed to pay Alice
$90,000 for the job, payments to be made as follows: $15,000 when the
207. See note 206 supra.
208. See note 198 supra.
209. See Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 528-29 (Ct. Cl.
1965); Royal Manor Apartments v. Powell, 258 Ark. 166, 170, 523 S.W.2d 909, 911
(1975); Curators of the Univ. of Mo. ex rel Shell-Con., Inc. v. Nebraska Prestressed
Concrete Co., 526 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Dravo Corp. v. L.W. Moses
Co., 6 Wash. App. 74, 90, 492 P.2d 1058, 1068-69 (1971).
210. Materials and services furnished in most construction and service contracts are
incapable of being returned, and their value may be recovered. See, e.g., Dale's Serv.
Co. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 665, 534 P.2d 1102, 1105-06 (1975); RESTATPMENT OF CON-
TRAcrs § 347, Comment b (1932).
211. See note 215 infra for illustrations of restitution in the construction area. Con-
struction contracts often are complex and give rise to difficult legal and factual ques-
tions. The parties may be unsure which of them breached, whether one or the other
waived any rights or whether the contract was substantially performed. Thus, parties
tend to plead their case on several alternative theories, often including alternatively a
contract theory and a restitution-quantum meruit theory. See Scaduto v. Orlando, 381
F.2d 587, 594-96 (2d Cir. 1967).
212. For examples of restitution in the employment-service contract area, see Dade
County v. Palmer & Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 318 F.2d 18, 24 (5th Cir. 1963) (design and
construction engineering company which was discharged permitted to recover "the value
of the services [it had] rendered"); Musgrove v. Leonard, 97 Ariz. 44, 46-47, 396 P.2d
614, 616 (1964); Parrish v. Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 91, 318 P.2d 642, 645 (1957) (ar-
chitect may plead in the alternative on the contract and for quantum meruit).
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foundation was in, $15,000 when the house was framed and roofed, and
the balance when the house was completed. After the foundation was
in and before the house was framed and roofed, Bob repudiated the con-
tract and ordered Alice off the job. He had not paid her and she had
spent $45,000. Alice had seriously underestimated her costs, and had
she completed the house as agreed, it would have cost her $120,000,
including the $45,000 she had already spent. Bob hired Clarice to finish
the job. He paid her $100,000 to complete it.
If Alice sued for expectancy damages, she would recover the con-
tract price ($90,000) minus her cost to complete ($75,000), or
$15,000. Since Alice had spent $45,000 at the time of the breach,
the expectancy award would leave her with a $30,000 loss. Had
Bob not breached and had Alice completed the house, she would have
spent $120,000 and received $90,000, thus suffering the same $30,000
loss.
If Alice chose a restitutionary recovery rather than expectancy, she
could recover the value of the work she had done, very probably
$45,000, thus avoiding any loss on the contract.213 Although restitu-
tion generally permits the aggrieved party to recover the "value" of
the work retained by the party who breached, 14 in construction con-
tracts "value" often is equated with the amount the aggrieved party
spent on the job.215
213. See Philadelphia v. Tripple, 230 Pa. 480, 79 A. 703 (1911) (full restitutionary
recovery by plaintiff who had made a losing contract). See also Scaduto v. Orlando,
381 F.2d 587, 595 (2d Cir. 1967); Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d
509, 528-30 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Dravo Corp. v. L.W. Moses Co., 6 Wash. App. 74, 91, 492
P.2d 1058, 1069 (1971).
214. See Dale's Serv. Co. v. Jones, 96 Idaho 662, 534 P.2d 1102 (1975):
Under a quantum meruit theory, the proper measure for recovery is the value
of the actual benefit realized and retained by the recipient of the services and
material. To arrive at this figure, the trial court on remand should: 1. Com-
pute the fair market value of the services provided and material furnished by
. . . [the subcontractors] before being terminated by . . . [the contractor],
considering the necessity to cure any substandard work, 2. Less the remunera-
tion . . . [the subcontractor received] for performing their services and fur-
nishing the fill.
Id. at 666, 534 P.2d at 1106. See also Goff v. Graham, - Ind. App.-,-, 306 N.E.2d
758, 767 (1974); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 347, Comment b (1932).
215. See United States ex rel Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d
606, 611 (2d Cir. 1944); United States ex rel. E. & R. Constr. Co. v. Guy H. James
Constr. Co., 390 F. Supp. 1193, 1222 (M.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 756 (6th Cir.
1974); Meinhardt v. Investment Builders Properties Co., - Colo. App. -, -, 518 P.2d
1376, 1379 (1973) (following owner's breach of a construction contract, contractor per-
mitted to recover amount expended on job as determined by contractor's records); Phila-
delphia v. Tripple, 230 Pa. 480, 487, 79 A. 703, 706 (1911); Dravo Corp. v. L.W. Moses
Co., 6 Wash. App. 74, 92, 492 P.2d 1058, 1069 (1971). Cf. Acme Process Equip. Co.
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Bob, who contracted to pay $90,000 for the house, would pay
$145,000 as the result of his breach-$45,000 to Alice in damages and
$100,000 to Clarice to finish the house. Alice would receive a $30,000
windfall as the result of Bob's breach. As noted above, the same
sanction-windfall pattern occurs when a party breaches a favorable con-
tract and nominal damages are awarded under the expectancy system.
Once again, pressure to perform is applied to the party who least needs
such pressure.
The restitutionary remedy is useful only to an aggrieved party who
entered an unfavorable contract. Restitution shields the aggrieved
party from any expectancy loss. Thus, in Problem 21, if Alice had
spent $45,000 at the time of the breach and could have completed the
house for $40,000, her expectancy award would have been $50,000
(the $90,000 contract price minus the $40,000 cost to complete) and
restitution would have yielded only $45,000, the value (usually the
cost) of what she had given.
Problem 22. The Baseball Player. Henry Allen was under contract
to play baseball for the Chicago White Sox during the 1976 baseball
season at a salary of $150,000 for the season, payable at the end of the
season. The team was to play a 160-game schedule. During the first
80 games of the season, Allen hit 75 home runs, knocked in 150 runs,
scored 130 runs, and played errorless ball at first base. After the 80th
game, the owner of the club came into the clubhouse, told Allen that
Babe Ruth was his idol, that Allen was making shambles of Ruth's
records, and that, therefore, Allen was fired. Allen was stunned, but
left and looked for other work in baseball. Because of the reserve
clause, he was unable to locate any work in the United States. He did
get a job with a club in the Japanese Baseball League, however, and
finished the season there. They paid $200,000 for the half season.
Allen investigated and discovered evidence that his play for the White
Sox during the first 80 games caused an average of 20,000 more people
to attend each game than would otherwise have attended. The net gain
to the White Sox on the 20,000 extra seats sold per game was $3.00
per person, $60,000 more for each of the 80 games, or a total of
$4,800,000 as a result of his play.
Suing in restitution, Allen would be entitled to recover the value of
the services he rendered without regard to the contract price.210 If his
v. United States, 347 F.2d 509, 531 (Ct. C1. 1965) (quantum meruit recovery reduced
on showing that contractor's costs were excessive).
216. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co.,
146 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cfir. 1944); R STATEmENT 6F CoNmA crs § 347, Comment c
(1932).
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services were valued in terms of the dollar gain to his employer
as the result of Allen's services he would recover $4,800,000. With
such an award, the employer would be returned to the position
it occupied before entering the contract with Allen, and Allen
would have the dollar equivalent of the services he rendered. If Al-
len's services over the second half of the season matched those
rendered during the first 80 games, a nonbreaching employer would
have gained an additional $4,800,000 at a cost of $75,000, half of Al-
len's salary. As a result of the breach, the employer would, of course,
forfeit these profits in addition to the $4,800,000 awarded to Allen.
It is unlikely that Allen would recover $4,800,000 in his restitutionary
action. His services probably would be valued at their market price
rather than on the basis of the employer's profits resulting from his ser-
vices. " If the salary paid Allen by the Japanese Baseball League
were evidence of the market value of his services, he could recover
$200,000 for the half season with the White Sox.218
It generally makes more sense to value services in terms of their
market value than in terms of the dollar gain to the employer. If a
guard at Fort Knox single-handedly foils a scheme to steal all of the
gold stored there, and then is fired without cause and without being
paid, no court would permit the guard to recover an amount equal to
the value of the gold.& 19 In Problem 22, if Allen were awarded the
market price of his services the employer would still lose the $4,-
800,000 expected profit from Allen's services in the second half of the
season, and might pay substantially more than the contract rate for the
services actually rendered. Allen's employer seems to occupy a better
position than the owner of the home in Problem 21. The employer,
unlike the owner, would retain part of the benefit of the bargain made.
C. Restitution on Behalf of Plaintiff in Default
Problem 10 dealt in part with the rights of a plaintiff in default, but
concentrated on methods of calculating the expectancy rights of the
217. If the plaintiff's performance is part of the very performance for which de-
fendant bargained as part of an agreed exchange, it is to be valued, not by the
extent to which the defendant's total wealth has been increased thereby, but
by the amount for which such materials as constituted the part performance
could have been purchased from one in the plaintiff's position at the time they
were rendered.
RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTs § 347, Comment c (1932).
218. See note 217 supra.
219. The Fort Knox hypothetical was suggested by Professor Robert C. Baesemann,
then of the Department of Economics, Washington University, St. Louis.
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aggrieved party. The present discussion emphasizes the recovery
rights of the party who breached.
Problem 23. Breaching a Favorable Contract. Alice, a contractor,
and Bob, the owner of a lot, entered a contract under which Alice was
to build a house on Bob's lot for $60,000. When the building was one-
third complete and Alice had spent $15,000, she had a dispute with
Bob and repudiated the contract. Had Alice completed the house, she
would have spent a total of $45,000 and had a profit of $15,000. After
the repudiation, Bob invited bids for the completion of the house. He
accepted the low bid of $40,000 to finish the house and upon its comple-
tion paid $40,000 to the new contractor and moved into the house. Bob
refused Alice's demand for payment and she filed suit against him.
Since Alice breached the contract, an action by her for expectancy
damages would be inappropriate. 220  Her recovery, if any, must be
under a quantum meruit or restitution theory.22 1 Bob paid $40,000 to
the second contractor and received a house. Unless required to pay
$20,000 to Alice, Bob would have a windfall by obtaining the house
for less than the $60,000 he agreed to pay. When a plaintiff in default
sues in restitution, recovery is limited to the lowest of three figures:
(1) a pro rata share of the contract price222 (so that the party will not
220. See Jones v. Hartmann, - Colo. App. -, -, 541 P.2d 123, 125 (1975); Kirk-
land v. Archbold, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 481, 484, 113 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ohio App. 1953);
Burke v. McKee, 304 P.2d 307, 308 (Okla. 1956); Wasserburger v. American Scientific
Chem., Inc., 267 Ore. 77, 82, 514 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1973); Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah
2d 190, 194, 364 P.2d 418, 420 (1961).
221. The courts do not agree about the right of a plaintiff in default, such as Alice,
to recover the value of the net benefit conferred if the failure to perform is wilful or
in bad faith. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1932) takes the more restrictive
view, permitting recovery by the plaintiff in default only if "the plaintiff's breach or non-
performance is not wilful and deliberate . . . ." See also Harris v. The Cecil N. Bean,
197 F.2d 919, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1952); Gillis v. Gillette, 184 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir.
1950); Trachsel v. Barney, 264 Ore. 29, 34, 503 P.2d 696, 698-99 (1972). A more liberal
view, permitting the plaintiff in default to recover the value of the net benefit conferred
without regard to the nature of the breach, is found in the landmark case of Britton v.
Turner, 6 N.H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834). While Britton v. Turner was an employ-
ment case, it had a substantial impact on construction cases resembling Problem 23. See
Peters v. Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 59-60, 152 N.W.2d 103, 109 (1967); Power-Matics,
Inc. v. Ligotti, 79 N.J. Super. 294, 306-07, 191 A.2d 483, 490 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1963) ("that plaintiff may have been in wilful default does not bar his recovery for rea-
sonable value"); Kirkland v. Archbold, 68 Ohio L Abs. 481, 485-87, 113 N.E.2d 496,
499-501 (Ohio App. 1953); Burke v. McKee, 304 P.2d 307, 308-09 (Okla. 1956).
222. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 357 (1932) ("ratable proportion of the
agreed compensation"). If more than a pro rata share of the contract price were recov-
erable, the defaulting plaintiff would benefit from the breach. In Britton v. Turner, 6
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profit by breaching); (2) the value of the performance given to the
aggrieved defendant2 23 (so that payment is for no more than was re-
ceived); or (3) an amount which will leave the aggrieved party in at
least as good a position as if the contract had been performed 24 (so
that the aggrieved party will not suffer any loss from the breach).
A $20,000 award would accomplish all three objectives in Problem
23. Alice completed one-third of the house; $20,000 would not exceed
a pro rata share of the contract price. Bob paid 40,000 to the second
contractor; a $20,000 payment to Alice would leave Bob in as good a
position as if Alice had not breached. If the value of Alice's perform-
ance were calculated as the amount it would have cost Bob to have
the first portion of the house built by a second contractor, the $20,000
award would represent such value.
If Alice recovered $20,000, she would receive $5,000 of the $15,000
profit she would have made had she performed. The prospect of
receiving that portion of the profit, however, would not encourage Alice
to breach the contract. By breaching, she surrendered her right to two-
thirds ($10,000) of the profit she would have earned had she per-
formed in full. In paying the $20,000 to Alice in addition to $40,000
to the second contractor, Bob would pay exactly the amount he
promised to pay originally. Unless a court wished to punish Alice for
having breached, she could recover $20,000.
The courts evidently value the part performance of a plaintiff in
default without regard to the fact that this value may include a portion
of profit..2 5  Limiting Alice's recovery to $15,000, by deducting her
N.H. 481, 26 Am. Dec. 713 (1834), plaintiff was permitted to recover a share of the
contract price in proportion to the amount of work he performed. See Texas W. Finan-
cial Corp. v. McCraw Candies, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 445, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1972) (90 per-
cent of contract price awarded where machine operated at 90 percent of capacity);
Burke v. McKee, 304 P.2d 307, 309 (Okla. 1956).
223. See C & S Distribs., Inc. v. Simon, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 631, 634, 238 A.2d 443,
445 (1967); Peters v. Halligan, 182 Neb. 51, 60, 152 N.W.2d 103, 109 (1967); Burke
v. McKee, 304 P.2d 307, 309 (Okla. 1956); Trachsel v. Barney, 264 Ore. 29, 34, 503
P.2d 696, 699 (1972) (plaintiff failed to recover partly on the ground that there had
been no showing that the work done was beneficial to the defendant); Sadler v. Middle
Tenn. Elec. Member Corp., 36 Tenn. App. 495, 499-500, 259 S.W.2d 544, 546 (1953).
224. See Harris v. The Cecil N. Bean, 197 F.2d 919, 922 (2d Cir. 1952); Texas W.
Financial Corp. v. McCraw Candies, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 445, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1972);
C & S Distribs., Inc. v. Simon, 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 631, 634, 238 A.2d 443, 445 (1967);
Power-Matics, Inc. v. Ligotti, 79 N.J. Super. 294, 307, 191 A.2d 483, 490 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1963).
225. See note 223 supra.
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profit, would result in a windfall to Bob. Such a limitation, although
contrary to the general rule, would be consistent with the tendency to
penalize parties who breach favorable contracts.220
Problem 24. Breaching an Unfavorable Contract. Alice, a contrac-
tor, and Bob, a lot owner, entered a contract under which Alice agreed
to build a house on Bob's lot for $75,000. Alice repudiated the contract
after she was one-third through with the house and had spent $28,000
on the job. Had Alice completed the job, she would have spent a total
of $84,000. Bob had the house finished by another contractor to whom
Bob paid $65,000. Bob refused Alice's demand for reimbursement of
the $28,000 she had spent.
Unless required to pay $10,000 to Alice, Bob would receive the house
for less than he contracted to pay for it. If compelled to pay her more
than $10,000, he would pay more for the house than agreed. If Alice
received $10,000 from Bob, she would be $18,000 out-of-pocket, since
her cost at the time of breach was $28,000. Had Alice performed, she
would have spent $84,000 on the house in return for a $75,000 payment
by Bob. Breach would cost Alice $9,000 more than performance. If
Alice could have predicted this result, she probably would not have
breached the contract.
If Bob could have located a contractor to complete the house for
$50,000, less than it would have cost Alice to finish, Alice might have
made a case for a $25,000 award. Bob would receive the house for
the $75,000 contract price; Alice would not recover more than a pro
rata share of the contract price; and she would not receive more than
the value of the work she had done. One problem would remain. A
$25,000 award would leave Alice only $3,000 out-of-pocket, a position
substantially better than the $9,000 loss she would have suffered had
she performed. Knowledge that she could reduce her loss by $6,000
would encourage Alice to breach. If the award were less than $25,000,
Bob would receive a windfall, acquiring the house for less than he con-
tracted to pay. One might argue that Bob would receive not a wind-
fall, but a reward for his ability to find contractors to complete the
project cheaply. Unless Alice's position after the restitutionary award
would be no better than her post-performance position, Alice would
profit by her breach. If she could predict such a profit, the economics
of the situation would encourage a breach.
226. See notes 54-56, 208-19 supra and accompanying text.
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D. Promissory Estoppel
Promissory estoppel has become a common basis for recovery since
the promulgation of Section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts in
1932. The tentative draft of Restatement (Second) of Contracts has
retained Section 90, with the proviso that a promise is enforceable only
to the extent necessary to avoid injustice.2 27 The partial enforcement
doctrine of the Second Restatement has received some judicial sup-
port.22s
VII. CONCLUSION
The expectancy system's concentration on the status of the aggrieved
party leads to damage assessments that, in many situations, neither
encourage nor discourage performance. In the absence of consequential
damages, a total breach by one who makes a losing contract leaves both
parties in their expectancy positions-the aggrieved party by design and
the party who breached by accident. With total breach and no conse-
quential damages, the only person encouraged to perform is the one
who makes a favorable contract, yet the contract itself encourages such
a person to perform. The party who breaches loses the benefit of the
bargain and the other party receives a positive reward by being per-
mitted to avoid the loss contracted for.
The consequential damage portion of the expectancy system tends
to encourage performance in many situations by placing the party who
breaches even a losing contract in a worse position than performance
would have achieved. Because parties to contracts are deemed to have
relatively limited powers of foresight, however, the aggrieved party
often fails to achieve expectancy; because of the foreseeability limita-
tion, performance is often encouraged less strongly than it otherwise
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tentative Drafts .1-7, 1973):
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.
228. See Janke Constr. Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 386 F. Supp. 687, 697-98
(W.D. Wis. 1974), afl'd, 527 F.2d 772 (1976); Hunter v. Hayes, - Colo. App. -,
-, 533 P.2d 952, 954 (1975); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 701-
02, 133 N.W.2d 267, 276-77 (1965). See also Ehert Co. v. Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc.,
523 F.2d 280, 284 (7th Cir. 1975); Borden v. Chesterfield Farms, Inc., 27 App. Div.
2d 165, 168, 277 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (1967) (concurring judge argued for the application
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) test for determining damages). Cf. E.F. Hutton & Co.
v. Fox, 518 S.W.2d 849, 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974 no writ).
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would be. Mitigation, of course, also ameliorates the impact of breach
on the party failing to perform, further softening the pressure to per-
form. Not only does the expectancy system tend to adopt a neutral
stance toward performance, it operates at times to prohibit the parties
from stipulating damages in an amount sufficient to encourage
performance.
The availability of restitution as an alternative does not alter
the system's neutrality. Restitution, like expectancy, encourages per-
formance by one who makes a favorable contract; it does no more than
the expectancy system, however, to encourage performance by those
who make unfavorable contracts. And, of course, the goal of restitu-
tion-returning the aggrieved party to precontract status-is inconsist-
ent with the expectancy goal.
While the expectancy system has many internal inconsistencies, and
in many situations has little or no impact on the decision to perform
or to breach, the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code retained most
of the expectancy system is some indication that large parts of the
commercial world are satisfied with the way it functions. An effective
answer to the criticism leveled at the system may be: "It works."
Further investigation is necessary to determine whether, in fact, it
works well.220
229. In preparing a primer of the law of expectancy damages, my intention was to
establish a starting point for an in-depth study of contract damages. The necessary first
step for such a study was an articulation of the traditional doctrines. While the main
threads of the traditional concepts of the expectancy system are presented here, it
should be understood that the primer is not intended to be more than the name implies--
an introduction to basic concepts.
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